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TEACHING BODIES: CURRICULUM AND CORPOREALITY
by
JULIE GARLEN MAUDLIN
(Under the Direction of John A. Weaver)
ABSTRACT
I began thinking about the topic of this dissertation at first in 2003 when I found
myself expecting a third child while teaching full-time and pursuing a doctoral degree,
and in earnest later that year at Bergamo, where I began to see a connection between my
own interest in desires and bodies as they relate to education and the work of several of
my colleagues. I began to think about the role of the body in the curriculum. Everyday
that we enter the classroom we bring our bodies and our desires along with us. We
educate and learn from gestating bodies, ill bodies, able and “dis”-abled bodies, bodies
that shape who we are as students and teachers. And yet, it seems that in many ways, the
body becomes unimportant, if not invisible, in the traditional classroom.
What I hope to accomplish with this dissertation, then, is to examine what I
perceive as the disembodiment of curriculum, and bring the body into the educational
practice and discourse in a way that is meaningful to the everyday practice of teachers
and relevant to the future of curriculum at large. This project is not an attempt to
reconceptualize physical education, although the binary we have constructed between
kinesthetic and academic education is relevant. This study is also not a rearticulation of
kinesthetic learning theory; the decision to utilize bodily movement as a way of helping
students internalize concepts might be considered an initiative to involve the body more
in the curriculum, but this study is more about what we do to, and from, and in our bodies
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than with them. I want to understand in what ways the body and pedagogy are
intertwined, to explore how the ways we have thought about the body have shaped how
we are as students and teachers, and to imagine an “embodied” curriculum that reflects
the ways that the postmodern, posthuman body and the curriculum act with/in, on and
against one another.

INDEX WORDS:

Curriculum, Corporeality, Teaching, Body, Text, Education.
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CHAPTER 1
WRITING ON THE BODY
What About the Body?
Why write about the body? One might wonder what brings a student of
curriculum studies, pursuing not an M.D. but a doctorate in education, to study the
relationship between curriculum and the body. Pinar et. al (1995) have suggested that
scholars choose their research topics with “the promise of excitement not of prudence”
and it was indeed this promise, this stirring that grew out of my own bodily experiences
that led me to this study (p. 868). This dissertation is about bodies; it is about a space
where paradigms, bodies of knowledge, merge with the material bodies of teachers and
students. It began when, in my last semester of doctoral coursework and my second year
of teaching fourth and fifth graders at a non-traditional state-funded public charter school,
I found myself expecting a third child. In the months leading up to that unexpected
discovery, I had been plagued with intense headaches and bouts of overwhelming despair
with each approaching menstrual cycle. I had never before experienced that kind of
instability, an overpowering sense that my world was suddenly spinning out of control.
Desperate to understand what I was experiencing, my husband probed me for some
explanation. The only description that I could come up with was that I wanted to “paint
the world black.”

When these episodes occurred, not only was I not able to teach, but

all I could do was retreat to my dark bedroom until the symptoms disappeared. In an
effort to diagnose the cause of the problem, my obstetrician suggested I discontinue my
oral contraceptives, and, in spite of alternative measures, it was only a matter of weeks
before my old symptoms vanished and new ones appeared.
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When I discovered that I would be adding another child to the three and five year
olds I was already raising while teaching full-time and pursuing a doctoral degree, I faced
several dilemmas, but after I had considered the exhausting logistics of adding gestating
to my already lengthy Things To Do list, I started thinking about how this pregnancy,
brought forth out of my own attempts to control my body’s hormonal spiral, would
impact me as a teacher and a researcher. How would I tell my nine and ten year old
students that I was pregnant, and what would they think? How would I cope with the
constant display of this incredibly public product of my sexuality? The pregnancy would
change the way I felt, looked, and even thought. How would those changes be felt by my
students? In many ways, my new corporeal reality called into question the performative,
poststructural theory that had resonated so strongly with me as I wondered how to
reconcile what I perceived as conflicting identities.
That year at Bergamo, the annual conference of the Journal of Curriculum
Theorizing (JCT), I probed these issues further with a paper titled, “Where is the Love?,”
in which I explored the discourses of desire as they relate to education. As I sat in on the
sessions of several of my colleagues that year, I heard one story after another that
resonated with thoughts about education and the body: Marla Morris spoke about
teaching through the ill body, Delease Wear talked about compassion in medical
education, and Leigh Medders shared her personal experience of watching her young
niece battle cancer. The more I heard, read, and talked about the body, the more I wanted
to explore its impact on education and its role in shaping curriculum.
My curiosity intensified a few months after the birth of my son, John Stokes,
when I began my new job as a fourth grade teacher in a rural public elementary school. I
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was still feeling a little out of place in my new traditional setting when my homeroom
students began to arrive with their parents for Open House. I was taken aback when one
parent after another greeted me with an explanation of the medications their child took
for attention deficit disorders. Eventually, I found out that seven (a full twenty-five
percent) of the 26 homeroom students I would teach the last half of the school day had
been diagnosed with attention deficit conditions. Two of those students had also been
diagnosed with additional conditions, including oppositional defiant disorder. Having
only worked with a few medicated students in my two years teaching in a university town
only a hundred miles away, I had not anticipated this change, which fueled my thoughts
about how the body has interacted with the curriculum. Working with these students
brought new questions to mind, as I couldn’t help feeling that their bodies had something
to say about the state of education. What is it exactly that we are treating? What are our
bodies trying to tell us about the ways that we have attempted to train them into
submission?
One additional classroom experience contributed to the shaping of this
dissertation just as I was attempting to organize my proposal. I found myself in the
middle of a paradigm shift in the way that education has approached students with
disabilities. Suddenly, “inclusion” had emerged anew from the 1980s as the “new”
buzzword, and both special education and regular education teachers were scrambling to
adjust to this new mindset. As I attended workshops to learn how to serve the needs of
students with disabilities without “resourcing” them to a special education classroom, I
began to think about how the students had come to be excluded in the first place. I
wondered how our ideas about disabled bodies, bodies that some might refer to as
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“abnormal,” have shaped educational practice? I began to suspect that there might be
more to the traditional exclusion model of educating disabled students than mere
logistics.
Finally, I cannot omit one final experience that further ignited my thoughts as I
was writing. In the fall of 2005, the health of my 89 year-old maternal grandfather,
Stokes, began a slow but steady decline. He had been struggling with Parkinson’s for
more than a decade, and as I anticipated his looming death, I reflected on the way that our
assumptions about illness and the body had constructed the last years of his life.
Although he never explicitly discussed his illness, I knew that this proud, stern man who
had for so long maintained such a tight rein on his actions and emotions, was ashamed of
the bodily impulses that eventually left him virtually helpless. He took his last breath on
Christmas Eve morning, and his death left me with all kinds of questions about bodies,
and control, and stories, and illness.
All of these questions lead to the underlying theme of this dissertation, the role
theories of the body and the body itself has had in shaping curriculum, and conversely,
the role curriculum has had in shaping the body. To understand these interconnections,
we as educators and students must recognize the ways we act on, in, and through the
body. As O’Farrell et al (2000) observes, “The body is trained, shaped and toned to
perfect tautness in minute detail at every turn and under every circumstance” (p. 1).
Whether or not we are conscious of it, this training of the body occurs through a wide
variety of educational practices, including those discussed here: standardized testing, the
overuse of textbooks, and popular culture, among others.
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Recently, academia has seen an upsurge of interest in what Rosemarie GarlandThompson (2003) calls “body criticism.” However, many critical studies fail to bridge
the gap between the discursive and the material, and “overlook particular bodies
embedded in specific situations” (Garland-Thompson, 2003). As Kathy Davis (1997)
notes, “The body may be back but the new body theory is just as . . .disembodied as it
ever was” (18). Thus, this dissertation seeks to answer the question, “What about the
body?” Can the material body exist in the discursive complexities of postmodernism, and
if so, where, and how?
As I began looking for insight into that question, I looked not to my own
embodied experiences but to text. Instead of first asking, “What about my body?” I
began reading everything I could find about theories of the body and embodiment. I
knew when this project had begun for me, but I found myself at a loss when it came to
articulating exactly what I was hoping to express in my writing. Having become so
accustomed, as a product of a traditional text-based education, to remanding myself to
text, it did not occur to me to begin my inquiry by first looking inward. Somewhere in
the early stages of my dissertation, however, I came across Donna LeCourt’s (2004)
opening to Identity matters: schooling the student body in academic discourse. She said
that her book
began in stories of failure and frustration, from an attempt to better understand
what was taking place in my classrooms and why I was so invested in the
pedagogies that kept failing me. From practice, I was led to theory, but theory
does not begin in the academy; it begins in everyday interactions and reactions. It
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begins in autobiography. It becomes a search for understanding that everyday
realities or accepted ways of thinking cannot explain (p. 1).
When I read those words that I knew I must rethink the way that I was going about my
own “body project.” I understood then that if I hoped to articulate a sense of thinking
about education through, and with, and in the body, I must begin by thinking through my
own muddled perceptions of what it means to live from the body.
My Body Autobiography
After that initial realization, I thought for a long time about when and how I began
to think about my body, and eventually the memories began to resurface. One of the first
things I can remember is that I disliked the word “nose.” When I was three years old, I
was taking our Bassett Hound, Hushpuppy, down the front steps when I became
entangled in the leash and fell face-first on the hard brick. Fearing my nose might be
broken, my parents took me to the emergency room, and I remember feeling mortified at
having to lie on the table and have x-rays taken of my body and particularly my nose,
which I felt was private. Fortunately, there were no broken bones, but that experience
was implanted permanently in my memory.
I must have been about five when I started to wonder if I might be fat. It was
sometime after we moved back to the small South Georgia town where my mother had
grown up. She was in her early thirties then; she was thin and had long chestnut colored
hair. I admired her; she was tall and beautiful and seemed to wear a smile everywhere we
went. I remember waiting for her to finish her workouts at the Shape Shop, where all the
women seemed equally fit and trim. My dad was also tall and handsome with his dark
features and slim build. I thought he looked like Tom Selleck, who was starring in
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Magnum P.I. then. I remember shopping in health food stores, eating carob chip cookies,
the pantries full of muscle shakes and diet supplements.
I was five when Return of the Jedi opened, and when we went to see it in the
theater, I left with Carrie Fisher’s image permanently imprinted in my mind. She was
everything I hoped to become: smart, strong, and of course, impossibly skinny.
Somewhere during this time, I began to think differently about my body, comparing
myself to the images that circulated in my consciousness. Once I started kindergarten, I
was fitted with glasses, and suddenly I found myself very conscious of being different
from my friends. My sister, gangly and four years my senior, was just beginning an
awkward pre-adolescent stage, and she was struggling to make friends in a new school. I
don’t remember ever consciously committing myself to being like the “in-crowd,” but I
had an intense desire to be liked, to escape the hurt and pain I saw in my sister’s eyes.
I was probably about nine when I started to think about dieting. We have an old
home video in which I am the first to proclaim proudly after Christmas dinner, “I’m
going on a diet the first of the year!” Of course, I sneak back in a few minutes later to
assure viewers that I am not really going on a diet – I certainly didn’t want anyone to
know that I really did think I was fat. I didn’t think they would understand. Just before I
turned ten, I convinced my parents that I was ready for contacts, and I remember feeling
so relieved that I would no longer have to look like a “nerd.” Then I developed breasts,
which at first wasn’t a problem, because bra-wearing had become the new trend for the
fourth grade girls at my elementary school, although only a few of us actually needed
one. But a few months later I started the fifth grade at the middle school where all the
elementary schools merged. I found myself separated from my old friends, and I quickly
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gravitated toward the “popular” girls I knew from the other schools, most of whom were
flat-chested and thin, and I found myself feeling different once again. I wore tank-tops
under my clothes all year to avoid having to wear a bra. It was that year that I most
remember feeling that I was fat.
I remember being comforted by food. My father’s mother, who lived just down
the road from us, was a fantastic cook who equated food with love. She cooked for us
because she loved us, and if you wanted her to know that you loved her, you’d better eat.
With both sets of grandparents in town, we were always coming together to eat on
Sundays, holidays, and birthdays, and huge Saturday morning breakfasts complete with
biscuits, gravy, potatoes, ham, bacon and Coca-Cola were a family tradition. My
grandmother had grown up with so little that to her, having a fleshy body was a sign of
prosperity. She used to say to me fondly, “You’re pleasantly plump.”
By seventh grade, I had completely given up on two-piece bathing suits. My
breasts had already grown to their adult size, and I was sharing my mom’s 36C bras. I
was intensely self-conscious about them. I remember a favorite pink name-brand
sweatshirt I had bought with my own money that year – my protruding breasts left it
hanging loosely at my waist and one day a boy asked if I was pregnant. I was mortified.
I had never even kissed a boy! When I started my period in November that year, I was so
embarrassed by it that I simply borrowed supplies from the bathroom and went to school
without telling my mom, only to call her crying a few hours later. I couldn’t come out
and say what had happened, but she knew. Menstruation was something that was only
talked about in euphemisms in my family. I quickly learned that issues of the body, of
the flesh, whether of loathing or desire, were not something to be discussed.
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By the time I got to high school, I had almost completely given up on desserts,
and I progressed from packing my own healthy lunch (I never ate lunchroom food) to
just drinking Slim-Fast. Of course, I still splurged now and then, but not without feeling
guilty. I started thinking about my body almost all the time. I wasn’t fat – I weighed 120
pounds – but that was fifteen or twenty pounds more than many of my friends. I was
critical of anything I put on, wearing only clothes that I saw as flattering. I walked, ran,
played tennis and soccer, and there was little time for eating with a tight schedule of
honors classes and extracurricular activities. My body was gradually growing into my
breasts, but they were still a source of embarrassment for me. I remember jokingly
singing “working nine to five” during a soccer practice, and the entire co-ed team
breaking out into laughter when my coach blurted, “Sing it, Dolly.”
By the time I started college, I was a few inches taller and just ten pounds heavier,
but I was headed for diet disaster. The first two quarters, I showed tremendous restraint
thanks to the meager grocery budget enforced by my sister, who was my roommate that
year. But by spring quarter, I had broken up with my hometown boyfriend of over three
years and joined a sorority. Soon, I was enjoying restaurant food and pitchers of beer
every night. It didn’t take long for me to pack on 20 pounds, and find myself feeling
completely miserable. That summer I exercised, worked two jobs, ate one meal a day,
and quickly lost the weight and then some. When I got back to school in the fall, my
sorority sisters went on endlessly about how great I looked. I remember thinking how
awful I must have looked before I had lost weight.
Although I had definitely toyed with the idea of starving myself since I was
young, my sophomore year of college was the first time that I ever let myself get carried
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away. There were weeks when my entire intake consisted of a few small grilled chicken
breasts. I would take cold medicine or dexatrim to help stave off the hunger pains. I was
involved in one bad relationship after another just when I was in the middle of my first
earth-shattering philosophy class, and all I wanted to do was starve away the uncertainty.
Eventually, a friend intervened and I starting eating again, but indulging still remained
out of the question. I existed on aerobics and about ten grams of fat a day for the rest of
the year.
The next summer I started running, and I eased up on my dietary restrictions a
little. A few months later, I started dating the man that would become my husband, and
through our mutual love of food, relaxed those restrictions a little more. The next year,
we got married. A month later, just after I started my senior year of college, I got
pregnant with our first child. I was 21 years old.
My first pregnancy was a strange experience. I had grown up with these mixed
messages about becoming a successful career-woman and being a good mother, but since
I was just finishing up college, thoughts of a career were still in the background, and I
was very much caught up in the whole notion of family and motherhood. I saw the
pregnancy as an excuse to leave my old life of restraint behind, and I quickly began eight
months of excessive indulgence. I gained 45 pounds, and although I was aware of how
large I had become (“great with child,” as one former professor noted), it wasn’t as much
of an issue for me.
What was strange about that pregnancy was not so much the way I perceived my
body, but the way I was perceived by others. Apparently, pregnant women were few and
far between on college campuses, because I endured constant stares from the other
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undergraduates as I walked across campus to my “Physical Education for People with
Disabilities” class. It was embarrassing to walk across campus because I felt like such a
spectacle. Hadn’t they ever seen a pregnant woman before? Aside from the stares, once
the pregnancy became visible, I noticed a marked difference in the way I was treated by
the professors who did not know me before. They didn’t call on me. I have always been
an active participant in class discussions, the one student my professors could count on to
have something to say about anything, but suddenly it was as if my intellect was being
completely dismissed. I had to work to prove myself in order to be included in the
discussions once again. The message that I received from that experience was that smart
people do not have babies at 22.
Something else happened during this first pregnancy. I became accustomed,
actually fond of, to the monthly, then bi-monthly, then weekly visits to my obstetrician.
There was something so oddly comforting about having my body under constant care,
something so satisfying about feeding and tending my body so ceremoniously,
religiously. Although most of the time I couldn’t bear to look at the scale when I was
being weighed, somehow those frequent examinations helped me to validate my
temporary and partial disregard for the cultural norms I had measured myself by for so
long.
When I became pregnant with our second child at 24, I had already proven myself
to my graduate school professors, which actually made it harder for me to tell them. I
remember agonizing over having to make the announcement to my professors, who were,
for the most part, male. They had high hopes for me, and I knew that they would,
however subconsciously, write me off when they discovered I was expecting baby
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number two. I finished my coursework and completed my oral comprehensive exams
when I just about five months along, so I escaped having to teach the huge undergraduate
classes while visibly pregnant, but I still had to endure the feeling that I was letting my
professors down by choosing another baby over a Ph.D. program. Chris and I moved
away from the college complex where we had been living, and I retreated into solitary
thesis hours to finish out my pregnancy in relative privacy.
After my son was born, I began running again, finished my thesis, started the
doctoral program and rediscovered the career-minded theorist that had been buried
beneath all the layers of maternity dresses and nursing bras. Throughout most of those
years, some of my fears about my bodily inadequacies were relieved by the sense that my
body was not “my own,” that my round belly and lingering fleshy, milk-filled breasts
were serving a purpose, but once my body felt like mine again, the thoughts (Dexatrim
dreams, I called them) returned. Running helped – it not only made me feel lean, it
brought me peace at a time when my mind had begun filling up with the questions that
stem from theory, and although I was more uncertain than ever about where I was headed
professionally, my doctoral studies and later my position as a teacher-leader at the charter
school reaffirmed my sense of self, my sense of being intelligent, strong, well. Although
that longing to be thinner, leaner, was always in the back of mind, my body, no longer a
spectacle, faded into the background for a while.
The first two years of the doctoral program were a time of great uncertainty to me.
I became overwhelmed with possibilities at a time when many of my life’s decisions had
already been made. Sometimes the contradictions of being a wife, a mother, and a
student of curriculum theory were too hard for me to consider, and so I pushed them into
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the recesses of my mind. It should come as no surprise that they surfaced in the form of
depression-ridden migraines, and you know what happens next.
My third pregnancy was the least physically complicated and the most mentally
and emotionally overwhelming. Before I had offered my body freely to maternity, but
now I felt betrayed. I had moved on from those days when the idealism of maternity
consumed my every thought; I had started to realize the “me” that had been hiding for so
long behind a desire for normalcy. Now I was forced to endure a painfully public
pregnancy as both a teacher and a doctoral student. I knew that I would fall madly in love
with the baby the minute that I saw him (I am a fool for babies, anyway) and that my
instincts would take over, but my body spoke the disappointment and fear my lips
wouldn’t. Somewhere in the second trimester, the headaches returned and they were
constant for weeks on end. By the third trimester, the headaches were replaced by
frequent low blood-sugar episodes that left my heart racing from the adrenaline and made
me feel weak and restless. I managed to defend my proposal somewhere around my
eighth month, and I thought I would spend the last few weeks of my pregnancy working
on my dissertation, but instead I just sat at home watching daytime television and feeling
sorry for myself.
By the time I was induced at 39 weeks, I was looking forward to being “myself”
again. I had lost about 25 of the 30 pounds I had gained just a week after my son was
born. I started running again when he was three weeks old. A few months later, I began
the new teaching job thirty miles away and found myself dealing with more stress than I
could have expected. The blood-sugar episodes returned and I started having heart
palpitations and anxiety attacks. I lived through that year in a sleepless daze.
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This year, I started working as a school-based Instructional Coach, so the stress of
lesson plans and classroom management has been replaced with the stress of school
improvement plans and curriculum development. The blood sugar episodes disappeared
when I left the classroom, and I have been running with more consistency lately, so the
palpitations have decreased, but the last two years have still held a lot of uncertainty for
me. I have left the support of my doctoral program colleagues, having moved back home
just before the baby came, and now I am left to contemplate where I am headed once this
dissertation is defended and bound.
I have been thinking about my body a lot more in these two years since I gave
birth to John Stokes. I weigh myself every single day. I run to find clarity, but I still find
myself feeling that I can’t be thin enough to satisfy the uncertainty I felt as my 30th
birthday approached and quickly faded into memory. Often, my obsessive thoughts have
even kept me from writing this dissertation, leading me to spend precious hours planning
and replanning my next diet and exercise plan instead. Even as I write to hopefully
understand my own body beyond the discursive fiction it has become, I have become
more steeped in my compulsive corporeality. It is such a constant theme for me that I
know it must impact what I do and say, how I perform my role as mother, teacher,
student, leader. At one point when I had committed myself to writing away every semiquiet moment I could find, I became so completely immersed in this text that the
discourse became nearly overwhelming, and its weight first gripped my throat like a vice
and then settled into my bones. I went on this way for weeks, knowing that articulating
these thoughts and casting them into the ether of academic discourse was the only way to
dispel the immensity. And so, I am still steeped in questions of the body, of my body, of
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the bodies of teachers and students, of the physical realities of “particular bodies in
specific situations,” of teaching bodies.
The Body in Theory
Exploring my own body autobiography helps explain where this study originates
for me and allows me to situate my body within the complex framework of academic
discourse. As a woman, a mother, someone whose physical body consumes my thoughts,
I understand that for me, disembodied theory, complete detachment from my body, isn’t a
possibility. I understand that my popular-culture mediated reality and my confusions
about what it means to be “an intellectual” have left me feeling distant and detached from
any embodied reality. Thus, this question, “What about the body?,” is one that is of
particularly importance to me, but I hope to bring to light here why it is also a question of
great significance for other educators and curriculum theorists.
While I will argue that the body (material, discursive, or otherwise) is largely
absent from the school curriculum, it is not to say that it hasn’t been a popular topic of
academic discourse. On the contrary, the body has been discussed in a number of ways:
“the discourse of the disruptive, transgressive body (erotics); . . . the discourse of the
disciplined, governed body (Foucault’s concern with technologies of the self or
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus); and . . . the discourse of the machine (the cyborgian
body)” (Mission and Morgan, 2000, p. 92). Indeed, discussions have proliferated
concerning the absent body, the regulated and docile body, the gendered body, and the
classed, sexed and raced body. Peter McLaren (1988) expands on these discourses to
provide some ways that the “body” has been defined: “The term “body” is a promiscuous
term that ranges wildly from being understood as a warehouse of archaic instinctual
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drives, to a cauldron of seething libidinal impulses, to a phallocentric economy waging
war on women, to a lump of perishable matter, to a fiction of discourse.” (p. 57). As
these descriptions illustrate, the body has been important in our attempts to recognize
how and where we are situated in these various discourses, and has become particularly
significant in recent years not only in feminist and postmodern theories, but, as Pillow
(2000) notes, “also more broadly in social theory as a place from which to theorize,
analyze, practice and critically reconsider the construction and reproduction of
knowledge, power, class and culture” (p. 199).
Discussions of if, and how, and where “the” body fits into academic discourse,
including curriculum theory, is also of particular importance because of the vast
technological changes that have changed our concept of “humanness” and the ways we
relate to our bodies. Just as nature is not separate from culture, neither is technology.
Today, technology not is not only influenced and is influenced by culture, it is culture.
When we consider how our lives are, as Gray and Mentor (1995) note, intimately shaped
by machines, we understand that such a profound presence must impact our corporeal
subjectivities. In fact, technology has long affected the way we think about our bodies;
the body has often been reduced to a mere machine or a computer that takes in
information and delivers an automatic response, especially when the mind/body binary is
allowed to stand unchallenged. It was technological advances in machinery that
prompted the era of Taylorism, which found its way to educational practice and
discourses of the body. A post-human future, then, is not so much a future as it is a
present reality. As Cary Wolfe (1995) observes, “The moment is irredeemably post-
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humanist because of the boundary breakdowns between animal and human, organism and
machine, and the physical and the non-physical (p. 36).
These breakdowns have been widespread; not only has the pervasiveness of
American mass media created a situation of sensory overload that forces our bodies to
compete with digital stimulation, but science has brought about new ways of promoting
longevity and “normalcy” through medication and a host of complicated biotechnical
devices. Donna Haraway (1989) explains that the body has become “ a biotechnical
cyborg – an engineered communications device, and information generating and
processing system, a technology for recognizing self and non-self (paradigmatically
through the immune system), and a strategic assemblage of heterogeneous biotic
components held together in a reproductive politics of genetic investment (p. 355). Such
posthuman phenomena require us to consider with great urgency if, and how, and where
the body figures into this emerging discourse as we invite the body back into the equation
through the proliferation of biotechnical machines.
In my use of the word “body,” then, I hope to evoke this multitude of discourses
that engage this term. Here, I seek to discuss “the” body, these bodies, bodies of
students and teachers, from a postmodern perspective of poststructuralism. While it is
impossible to adequately define the paradigm of postmodernism, which has had
implications across the disciplines, it is most closely associated with Lyotard’s (1984)
collapse of the metanarrative, overarching, unifying themes, in The Postmodern
Condition. Postmodernism calls into question themes such as race, gender, and class,
which seek to explain the nature of humanity. Postmodernism is seen as having grown
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out of the modern era of progressive art, architecture, music and literature that occurred
in the early decades of the twentieth century.
Postmodernism, then, can be perceived as a critique of the modernist “structures”
that were thought to be based on some essential, natural truth and were used to formulate
an understanding of how things “are.” Thus, developed from the postmodern
understanding of the absence of a fixed reality or a final, discernable meaning,
poststructuralism asserted that the structures underlying texts or speech were not distinct
and that a “real” or “true” structure could not be determined. As Baldwin et. al (2000)
note, “Poststructuralism is more concerned with the way in which versions of the truth
are produced in texts and through interpretation, which is always in dispute and can never
be resolved” (p. 25). The works of Derrida (1976), Baudrillard (1994/1981), and Deleuze
and Guattari (1983, 1987) exhibit these poststructuralist ideas with their characterizations
of self-subverting texts, linguistic signs, and shifting, interconnected, interdependent
subjectivities. As Poster (1990) explains, language structures, as they are understood by
poststructuralism, “refer back upon themelves, subverting referentiality and thereby
acting upon the subject and constituting it in new and disorienting ways” (p. 17). In this
way, texts, inscribed in the language (signs) we used to express our thoughts, are always
already unstable, corrupted by the gap that exists between the texts and language.
Moreover, from a deconstructive perspective, we understand that all texts lack stable,
autonomous meaning because our readings of them are inscribed in language that has no
reliable correspondence to the author’s intention. From this perspective, allencompassing “grand” readings are problematized. As Poster (1990) explains,
“Poststructuralists want to get beyond all forms of reductionist, totalizing interpretations
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of texts. For them texts are not homogeneous, linear bodies of meaning; they are not
expressions of authorial intention (p. 81).
It is difficult, if not impossible, to locate a single source of poststructural thought,
but it has been described as a theoretical response to Structuralism, the postwar
intellectual revolution brought on largely by Saussure’s (1959/1916) linguistic theory of
signs. In general, structuralism asserts that all phenomena are made up of a system of
structures, and that the relationships between the different elements of these structures are
more important than the individual elements that constitute the system. Both
structuralism and poststructuralism share an intellectual history based on Freudian
psychology, Marxism and the work of Saussure (1959/1916). Later, largely through the
anthropological work of Lévi-Strauss (1966), the literary studies of Barthes (1973), the
historical/philosophical approach of Foucault (1970), and the reinterpretation of Freud by
Lacan (1977) and the reinterpretation of Marx by Althusser (1971), among other works,
structuralism found its way into many other disciplines, including studies of popular
culture. In philosophy, poststructuralism is linked to Delueze’s (1962) re-reading of
Nietzsche in Nietzsche and Philosophy. However, as Peters (1999) notes,
“poststructuralism cannot be simply reduced to a set of shared assumptions, a method, a
theory, or even a school. It is best referred to as a movement of thought -- a complex skein
of thought -- embodying different forms of critical practice. It is decidedly
interdisciplinary and has many different but related strands” (p. 2).
Poststructuralism is vital to this exploration of the body, as it offers us ways to
interrogate our attempts to locate “normalcy” through the languages of science,
pathology, and neurobiology. As Weaver (2000) explains, poststructuralism “offers a
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critical reading of how science is constructed and used sometimes to justify certain
policies, eliminate unwanted voices, and apologize for all its flaws and humanness in
order to shroud science behind a cloth of godlike importance and ability (p. 6). Here,
poststructuralism provides a lens through which we can destabilize some of the prevailing
narratives that have led us to dislocate the body from the school curriculum in a number
of ways. In theorizing the poststructural body, we can fix our gaze on the future and gain
insight into the ways that our images of the body are and will be impacted by our
language and our social existences, as well as how our language and social existences are
and will be impacted by our bodies. The poststructural body, then, is discursive; it is a
site of “information and practice, of regulation, power and resistance” (Pillow, 2000, p.
214). It is “inscriptive” body, the social organism upon which “social law, morality and
values are inscribed” (Grosz, 1995, p. 33). And yet, it is not only that, for it is also the
“lived body,” the corporeal body, a site where physiological processes are in constant
states of function and breakdown. Postructuralism offers a paradigm that avoids
resurrecting a binary between inscribed and lived bodies, but allows these subject
positions to exist, if only in the complex system of the connections, gaps, “flows,”
interruptions, interactions and discontinuities that characterize our corporeal
subjectivities. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari (1983) describe the body as a
system of interconnected systems. As Lorraine (1999) explains, “The binary series is
linear in every direction because each flow-machine is connected to an interrupt-machine
and vice versa. That is, each flow-machine is always connected to another whose flow is
interrupted or partially drained off and vice versa in connective linear series where there
is always ‘and . . .’ ‘and then . . .’” (p. 119). I borrow from Deleuze and Guattarri’s
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notions of processes and interconnected systems to examine the ongoing processes of the
body and how they are connected to and interact with the processes of the educational
machine, itself a series of interconnected systems.
Similarly, Serres (1997/1991), draws on poststructural understandings of the
importance of the “and,” the in-between spaces, and the relationships between the body
and the mind. Serres offers the notion of a “third space” that exists somewhere between
the dualism of mind and body and draws these elements into an intimate connection. He
writes, “Body, muscles, nerves, direction and sensitivity, soul, brain and knowledge, all
converge in this third place” (p. 10). Here, I seek to explore the “in-between spaces” that
lie between the curriculum and the body, where the two converge, diverge, and otherwise
interact to construct and organize educational practice and academic discourse.
In spite of these discourses, we still find ourselves wary of bringing the
materiality of the body into academic discussions, perhaps because we do not want to be
guilty of asserting any essential “body” that corresponds to an original, natural form. To
do so would be to reify identity categories that we have already determined to be
discursive fictions: race, class, and gender. As Davis (2002) observes, DNA research has
completely undermined these identity categories; scientists have yet to identify any
person as belonging to a specific race through DNA analysis or find a “gay” gene, and
genetic gender is no longer a reliable indication of sexual preference. DNA, with its
constantly shifting outcomes and limitless possibilities, supports the instability brought
on by postmodernism. However, a recognition of this instability does not come without
discomfort, and it is perhaps for this reason that we have tended to leave the body out of
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our intellectual pursuits. Levy (2000) illustrates a “long history of avoiding the body” by
citing Liz Stanley’s (1997) discussion of the “missing person” of academic disciplines:
The person missing is one who is complex and rounded, who is “raced” and
classed and gendered, who has a body and emotions and engages in sensible
thought, and who inhabits space and place and time, and a person who may be a
man but can be pathetic and weak, or who may be a woman but can be
confidently powerful. The disciplines are concerned with “bits” of social life, but
even in their own terms what they choose to omit is considerable more than it
need be (p. 83).
If, as Stanley asserts, we are guilty of excluding this complex body from our intellectual
pursuits, then is it relevant to discuss the ancient question of the mind/body split. Since
Descartes announced over 400 years ago, “I think, therefore I am,” issues of the body
have often been relegated to margins of issues of the mind. Unfortunately, in spite of the
paradigm shifts brought on by postmodernism, this way of thinking still seems to find its
way into educational practice. In the mind/body binary, the mind is privileged over the
body so that the body becomes seemingly irrelevant in an educational context. The
intellectual is privileged over the physical so that disembodiment in many ways becomes
desirable. It is this kind of binary that leads us to view the body as a separate entity from
its environment, the curriculum. However, this study explores our selves not as
disembodied, abstracted individuals but as human beings in the context of bodies that are
impacted by the converging determinants of biology and social construction. Toward
that end, Shannon Sullivan (2001) borrows the term “transaction” from John Dewey and
uses it “to indicate the dynamic, co-constitutive relationship of organisms and their
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environments” (p. 1). Sullivan (2001) explains how she extends this term to a nondichotomous understanding of the body:
The term “transaction” reflects a rejection of sharp dualisms between subject and
object, and self and world, as well as a rejection of the atomistic,
compartmentalized conceptions of the subject and self that often accompany such
dualisms. The boundaries that delimit individual entities are permeable, not fixed,
which means that organisms and their various environments – social, cultural, and
political as well as physical – are constituted by their mutual influence and impact
on each other. This co-constitutive process does not merely happen once to
establish static entities that never change; because the relationship between
organism and environment is dynamic and ongoing, both organism and
environment are continually being remade by means of shifts and changes in the
other. Thus “transaction” designates a process of mutual constitution that entails
mutual transformation, including the possibility of significant change (p. 1).
The transactional body, like Delueze and Guattari’s concept of flow-machines, is a
dynamic body with permeable boundaries and is in a constant state of mutual influence
with the context in which it is situated. Here the body and the curriculum are not
independent entities but mutually influenced systems that are constantly being remade as
they shift and change.
What I hope to accomplish with this dissertation, then, is a recognition that our
bodies interact and intertwine with our pedagogies, and an understanding of how our
interactions with the body in theory and the body in culture operate to exclude embodied
knowledge from the curriculum. Here, I am writing on the discursive body, making my
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own mark, examining what between and beyond the symbols and signs that we have
ascribed to the flesh that mediates our relationships as teachers and students to the
curricula that we deliver and consume. How do the body and the curriculum operate with,
in, on and against one another? How have we sought to construct a disembodied
curriculum and what purpose has that curriculum served? In the chapters that follow, I
will explore these questions. First, I will examine the historical interaction between
theories of the body, “desubstantialized” culture, and the development of educational
environments characterized by sterile, controlled bodies. I will also explore here the ways
that the disembodied curriculum has shaped our perceptions of “disability” and the
development of special education. Next, I will engage the popular culture curriculum
and investigate the implications of “disembodied” educational practice through the
examination of social constructions of disability. Then, in order to demonstrate how the
disembodied school curriculum operates with social constructions of bodily “normalcy”
to construct disability, I will investigate the epidemic of attention deficit disorders as
symptomatic of disembodied curricula.

Finally, through the lens of disability studies, I

will draw on Lennard Davis (2002) concept of “dismodernism” in an attempt to rethink
and retheorize the postmodern, posthuman body through reflexive pedagogy. Here, I
hope to bring light to ways that students and teachers can reimagine corporeality and
liberate the body from the margins of educational discourse and classroom practice.
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CHAPTER 2
BODIES IN THE MARGINS: A DISEMBODIED CURRICULUM
One night when I was developing the framework for this chapter, John, almost
two, came toddling to the bedside where I was propped up on pillows with my laptop and
stacks of books. He pushed aside my laptop so that he could climb onto the bed and into
my arms. He smiled knowingly as lifted my t-shirt to reveal my bare stomach and
gleefully announced, “Tummy!” Each of my three children has had their own way of
seeking comfort from my body long after breast-feeding had ended: Taylor would always
reach for an ear to manipulate in her little fingers, and James was most content when he
was resting on my hip, but John, by far, has been the most sensual. He loves the feel of
soft, bare skin against his hand or cheek, so this “tummy time” for him is a nightly ritual.
On this night, he happened to realize that he did not have a “name” for my belly-button;
he examined it curiously, and looked to me for an explanation. After a few tries, he could
say “belly” (belly-button was just too many syllables) clearly, and then he began to
examine his own. “John’s belly, Mama’s belly,” he said, pointing back and forth,
drawing the distinctions between us.
After a while, he pushed the books aside and curled up beside me, still touching
my stomach with his two little feet, and drifted into dreams, leaving me to wonder if you
really ever outgrow the need for that kind of closeness, the comfort of human skin, a
knowing of the body. Why would such an act, which brought such pleasure when
involving a toddler, seem awkward if initiated by an older child? Why is that we feel that
as children grow into adults they must learn to distance themselves from that kind of
knowing, to control those bodily impulses, to create distance? Why do so many
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classrooms still seem quiet, tidy, sterile, impersonal? Why are our material bodies
relegated to the margins and footnotes of the “official” curriculum?
These questions circulated as I thought about why I believe the public school
curriculum and the educational practices it invites to be “disembodied.” Let me begin by
discussing the word, “disembodied.” The Oxford American Dictionary, conveniently
built into my laptop, defines it as: separated from or existing without the body, lacking
any obvious physical source. I think these definitions resonate with the way that I
perceive American school curriculum. When I first began to think about the relationship
between the body and the curriculum (I was reading Anti-Oedipus by Deleuze and
Guattari), I drew a cartoon of a school bus arriving to pick up a student, and the mother
meeting the bus holding only her child’s brain. The sentiment of my cartoon came from
both my own experiences as an educator trying to deliver a standardized, impersonal
curriculum in a meaningful way and the messages I have received as a student and
scholar about the conflicts between the “material” world and the life of an intellectual.
Here I want to allow my definition of disembodiment to be considered in all its
multiplicities, and many of the numerous ways this word can be defined fit the qualities I
am trying to communicate: bodiless, incorporeal, discarnate, insubstantial, impalpable,
spectral, phantom, wraithlike.
I would like to describe here how three discourses, all of which merge at the site
of body, problematize embodied knowing, learning, and teaching. These three
discourses, not intended to be all-inclusive or mutually exclusive, all operate to create
“distance” from the body. The first discourse involves modernist assumptions about
schooling. In spite of the vast changes that have taken place in American society, culture
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and technology in the last century, much of what is believed about the way teachers
should teach and children should learn is based on outdated notions about bodies and
curricula. These vast changes in culture and technology, particularly as they relate to
children, are taken up in the second discourse, which engages the postmodern, digitally
mediated realities of students. The third discourse is that of postmodern/ poststructural
identity theory, which brings identity and the body itself into a (necessary) state of
instability.
To say that the body is largely absent in the curriculum is not to say that the body
isn’t particularly prevalent elsewhere. In fact, with the proliferation of mass media
characteristic of American life, the body is literally everywhere. Weight-loss clinics,
products, books, plastic- surgery offices, advertisements, and reality television shows all
loom large in public representations of the body. Every year, there’s another diet craze,
new information about what makes us fat, updated research about how fat and unhealthy
we really are, and a few new additions to the list of celebrities with anorexia. What’s
more, we are constantly bombarded with pharmaceutical advertisements for all sorts of
body enhancing drugs: anti-depressant, anti-anxiety, anti-inflammatory, and drugs that
treat incontinence and erectile dysfunction. However, this overwhelming presence of
popular body discourse does not mean that we really understand our bodies and their
relationship to our experiences in the world any better than before. In fact, far from
helping us to embrace embodied knowing, these particular representations all serve to
reinforce a hegemonic notion of (largely unrealistic) bodily norms that leaves us all the
more confused and unsatisfied with our material contexts. Moreover, the traditional
educational environments in which many of our children find themselves offers them

36

neither a reliable outlet for interpreting these representations or a meaningful way of
relating to the body at all outside of planned exercise and intermittent sex education
instruction.
Postmodern Bodies
Before I discuss in detail the modern approaches to curriculum and educational
practice that have contributed to a disembodied curriculum, I want to consider the
postmodern/ theoretical and cultural contexts in which those processes currently operate.
Postmodernism, with its “incredulity toward metanarratives” as Lyotard describes it, has
problematized the notions of fixed unities, and so had destabilized identity and the notion
that the body could exist distinct biological construct, separate from and unaffected by
the cultural context in which its emerged. Postmodern thought across the disciplines
allowed us to understand that being, identity, is not rooted in, inherent to, the body, but
constructed through socio-cultural interactions. Thus, our bodies become texts, to be
read, interpreted, shaped, and discursively constructed. As a text, situated within
language and representation, the body as a simply a biological organism that is resistant
to cultural influence does not exist.
The postmodern theorization of the body is important to this study because it is all
about how those cultural influences have shaped our understanding of the body. The
postmodern subject position recognizes the relationship between body and language, and
thus, human experience. Thus, it would be antithetical for me to entertain any notion of
resurrecting the body as distinctly biological, but I want to consider some of the ways that
postmodern body can be problematic. With the rejection of a nature/culture binary, we
remove the body from one side of a false dichotomy, and situate it within a complex,
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fluid system, making it difficult to locate any substantive “self.” If the body does not
exist independently of culture, and we have to dissolve the notion that there is no distinct
“nature,” then we are no longer responsible for explaining how nature and culture work
together, and we are left with the question of whether the body can really be said to “be”
at all. As Peter McLaren (1988) points out, rarely in all the discourse of “bodies without
organs, shadow bodies which are merely discursive fictions, or fractured bodies
composed of solitary links along a signifying chain” do we ever find bodies and/or
subjects “who bleed, who suffer, who feel pain, who possess the critical capacity to
make political choices, and who have the moral courage to carry these choices out.” (p.
57).
Here, I share Gail Weiss’s (2003) sentiment about the predicament this
ontological indifference creates: “While I, too, accept the notion that the body can and
should be viewed as a text, I am also concerned about the ethical implications of such a
position, implications that are rarely acknowledged and, for that very reason, all the more
urgent to consider (p. 25). It is dangerous to assume that we could understand the body
outside of our cultural contexts, but we also take a risk by totally eliminating any notion
of the physical because we are left without a way to understand phenomena, such as
illness and injury, which seem to us to be physical. Perhaps this could explain we have
often failed to include disability in our criticisms of identity, because as, Holmes (2003)
notes, “Disability reminds us of that which is most personal (and thus shameful) in the
intellectual life, that which is not aesthetic or abstract. This same body is also what is
least personal, most generically human – that which we in academia hope to surpass with
distinctive and irreplaceable creations that usually celebrate our minds” (p. x)
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However, if we are to maintain an “incredulity toward metanarratives” as
Lyotard (1984) indicated, we must not allow postmodernism itself to become a nihilistic
metanarrative by constructing the body as either a discursive fiction or a distinct
biological organism. Even Derrida (1984), who announced the “death” of the subject,
admits that it does, indeed, exist:
I have never said that the subject should be dispensed with. Only that it should be
deconstructed. To deconstruct the subject does not mean to deny its existence.
There are subjects, operations, or effects of subjectivity. That is an
incontrovertible fact. To acknowledge this does not mean, however, that the
subject is what it says it is. The subject is not some meta-linguistic presence; it is
always inscribed in language. My work does not, therefore, destroy the subject; it
simply tries to resituate it (p. 125).
Similarly, if we intend to use postmodern/ poststructural knowledge as a connector rather
than a divider, we can resituate the body without denying the physical existence of the
flesh. We can see the body, as disability studies scholar Lennard Davis (1995) asserts, as
“a way of organizing through the realm of the sense the variations and modalities of
physical existence as they are embodied into being through a larger social/political
Matrix” (p. 14). This understanding of the body allows us to talk about the body without
erasing the significance of its physical substance. The body becomes, then, what
McLaren’s (1995) terms, the “point d’appui,” the point at which we find the “dialectical
reinitiation of meaning and desire” (p. 63). Lecourt (2004) puts it yet another way: “The
body, that is, experiences and enacts culture as more than a discursive relation, but rather
as a confluence of meaning, desire, and affect literally written into the flesh. We learn
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our identities in discursive relations that mediate experience; we perceive our bodies in
their material relation to the world via such discursively constructed identities (19). To
understand the body in this way allows us to bring the body back into academic discourse
in a way that is meaningful and creates a space in which we can begin to develop an
embodied postmodern/ poststructural paradigm.
Digital Bodies
If our intellectual engagements with postmodernism have left us feeling
theoretically “disembodied,” then our immersion in the postmodern media age has had a
similar effect culturally. A decade ago, Samuel Weber (1996) asserted that television
was “the most detached type of vision and audition” because the spectator can “see things
from places – and hence, from perspectives and points of view (and it is not trivial that
these are often more than one) – where his or her body is not (and often never can be)
situated” (p. 116). Weber suggests that television engages the senses in such a way that
the body’s sensory functions are not necessary. Such easily achieved and pervasive
detachment from the situated body would not be possible without a medium that
“becomes separation.” Having grown up immersed in a television culture (cable came to
the country when I was an adolescent and I have been hooked ever since), I can relate to
this sense of detachment in working through my own confusions about how to relate to
my body. I cannot perceive my body separately from the impossible images that have
permeated my being since infancy, and I am frustrated when I cannot find the sensory
satisfaction offered by television and film (the intensity of the music, the vibrant color,
the satisfying resolutions) in my daily lived experiences. I can only imagine how

40

frustrated I might be if I were subjected to seven hours of the sensory-deprived traditional
classroom environment.
If the detachment of television has changed the way we relate to our bodies, then
our confusion about how and where to situate our physical bodies has been exacerbated
by the new pervasiveness of the digital image. Weaver (2005) describes the
omnipresence and significance of this new media:
The digital image has entered into almost every aspect of our lives from the ways
in which we entertain ourselves to enhancing our bodies, how we learn, and even
how we die. Although computer generated, the digital images have entered into
the very materiality of our bodies and the realms of our thinking and
consciousness . . .While the world we live in has been transformed and while our
bodies are reconfigured into the posthuman, curriculum theorists have barely
taken notice (p. 79).
While the digital image remains in the margins of curriculum, as Weaver (2005) asserts,
it is emerging as an integral part of the broader cultural curriculum that guides our
understandings of how and where we, as subject-bodies, figure into the complex matrix
of competing sensory stimulations. McClaren (1988) observes that the byproduct of what
Aronowitz (1983) calls “visual culture” is “desubstantialized meaning,” in which we find
ourselves unable to “penetrate beyond the media-bloated surface of things, thereby
dismissing concepts such as “society,” “capitalism,” and “history” which a not
immediately present to the senses (p. 53).
The products of a desubstantialized culture are students like those that Marla
Morris (2003) describes in her graduate-level Curriculum Studies course:
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These presences, my students, embodied and troubled, haunted by a Southern
past, wish that I (queer-Jewish-carpetbagger) would teach methods, recipes, and
offer online, digital assignments. Their phantasies of erasing differences, erasing
difficulties of the face-to-face, erasing bodies dis(turbs) my pedagogical
sensibilities. Bodies matter. Their wish to disappear into cyberspace con-fuses
(p. 189).
Indeed, as Morris observes, bodies do matter, but they become obfuscated in the complex
visual, digital, desubstantialized media culture.
Absent Bodies
Thus, our children come to us, immersed in desubstantialized meaning and
prosthetic sensory overload, and we offer them neither a way to resubstantialize meaning
though embodied pedagogy or anything that meaningfully appeals to their need for
sensory stimulation. Instead, we offer a curriculum where the body is largely absent.
This absence persists not only in public school classrooms, but also in academic
institutions who prepare teachers for their roles as educators. bell hooks (1994)
describes this absence in her own experience:
No one talked about the body in relation to teaching. What did one do with the
body in the classroom? Trying to remember the bodies of my professors, I find
myself unable to recall them, I hear voices, remember fragmented details, but
very few whole bodies. The public world of institutional learning was a site
where the body had to be erased, go unnoticed (pp. 191-192).
This erasure of the body from the institutional discourses of teaching and learning leaves
us with instructional practices and environments that are distant from the realities of the
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body. Thomas Armstrong (1999) uses the example of the reclusive cashier, James Duffy,
in James Joyce’s (1914) short story Dubliners to introduce describe the way we tend to
separate the body from issues we perceive to be “of the mind:”
He meets a woman, has an intense intellectual affair with her, and then breaks off
the relationship when she presses her hand against his cheek. As part of his
description of Mr. Duffy, Joyce includes this rather curious line: “He lived a little
distance from his body.” By this Joyce meant that the man lived in a mental
prison divorced from any real contact with the sensory world. In a larger sense
Joyce’s character is a modern-day Everymind, an example of the split that has
occurred in contemporary society between mental and physical faculties” (p. 77).
While I would not go so far as to say that we are all living in mental prisons divorced
from contact with the sensory world, I will point out that, in learning theory, the body has
been reduced to second-class status. For example, take the largely influential work of
Jean Piaget. He posits that during the first two years of life, which he calls the sensorymotor stage, nearly all cognition occurs through the body: the infant relies on touch and
taste to experience the world. Once these physical actions become internalized, cognitive
development moves linearly through pre-operational (using symbols to represent objects),
concrete (thinking abstractly and making judgments about observable phenomena), and
formal operational (hypothesizing about abstract concepts and using deductive
reasoning). Clearly, the goal is move away from the cognition that occurs through the
body toward an abstract, disembodied understanding of the world. Piaget’s structural
analysis of cognitive development, which has profoundly impacted curriculum

43

development, privileges knowing through the mind over knowing through the body, and
depicts embodied cognition as simplistic and infantile.
One can see the influence of Piaget’s theories in many aspects of American
culture, from the classic stereotype of the “dumb jock” to the social privileging of
occupations in the humanities and sciences over the manual arts (Armstrong, 1999).
Because we have so deeply internalized these structures of cognitive development, we
also find it appropriate, if not necessary, to ensure that infants receive adequate sensory
stimulation (specifically touching), but once we cross the invisible binary into “abstract”
thinking, we believe we no longer “need” the body to learn. As we progress through the
developmental stages of childhood, we are taught to control our bodies so that the “real”
learning can take place.
As a result of this perceived need to distance ourselves from the body, we often
bring the body into the classroom only in the sense that we must access the “brain” to
train the “mind.” These privileged disembodied subjectivities carry over into the
classroom and influence pedagogical practice. We sterilize the curriculum and the
classrooms to make them “clean” and “safe,” distant from the realities of intermingling
bodies because the body is problematic when it comes to both academic discussion as
well as “proper” instruction. As Levy (2000) notes,
The body is actively sexual or at least sensual. (It may also be maternal, pregnant,
breast-feeding; in one way or another desirous, undisciplined, unruly, that is,
bodily). “Embodiment” draws our attention to a connection between materiality
and the psychic world, between social and cultural conditions and circumstances,
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between desires and pleasures, as well as disappointments; thinking about and
through all this undermines “orderly” teacher-student relations (p. 83).
Confronting these messy relationships means that we risk opening ourselves up to the
sensual, to desires, to disorder, which don’t fit in the devices and structures of control that
places the teacher/text at the center of instruction. Schools become not a Deleuzian
generative environment where everything functions at the same time amid hiatuses and
ruptures, but a controlled, sterile environment where bodies are necessary vehicles to
house the mental faculties.
Obedient Bodies
As it seems that the curriculum operates to dismiss the body part of the
educational process, it makes sense that bodies must be closely controlled in order to
ensure the continued obedience of the human body and the sterility of the educational
environment. In the post-Columbine era, the regulation and surveillance of bodies in
schools has become particularly prevalent (Webber, 2003). Middleton (1998) explains
that “Through Foucauldian lenses, power indeed shows up as ‘capillary,’ as it flows
through all parts of the school’s ‘corporate body.’ All individuals channel power:
Students and teachers police each others’ outward appearance, deportment, and behavior,
although it is the teacher who officially has power over the students” (p. 21). Similarly,
Sara Biklin (in Middleton, 1998) observes that “school rules regulate both students and
teachers. Teachers’ bodies are regulated by the very restrictions they establish for the
children . . . adults’ days [are] controlled by needing to be placed in a supervisory
position in relation to children” (p. 179).
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Perhaps even more important and personally relevant to my experience as an
educator is the control mechanism of textualization. In spite of widespread rhetoric about
the need for “authentic assessment” and student-centered learning, we continue to use
text to distance ourselves from the body. Rather than completely ignoring the body, we
look beyond it by transferring into texts that can be studied and evaluated, controlled.
Foucault (1978) has used textualization to explain the regulation of sex in disciplinary
society, in which sex had to be studied and committed to writing in order to be properly
controlled. The same concept can be applied to the textualization of knowledge in the
school setting. Textualization, in the curricular sense, becomes a mechanism of creating
distance between knowledge and the body; the self must be written in order to be
disciplined, controlled. Hayes and Johnson (2003) explain:
Textualization is one of the technologies of modern schooling. The process is put
into place through the emergence of the self by means of a constant remanding of
the self to the text (Fendler, 1993). In much of school curriculum, individuals
submit their inner thoughts and views to written or spoken texts so that they
become visible and accessible to the systems of control that evaluated and define
school knowledge. . . The authored text exposes the self to the powers of
surveillance and domination by opening the self for analysis, critique, and
regulation within the system of schooling. (p. 147.)
There are many ways that the authored text emerges in schooling, including canonical
textbooks, teacher-directed writing, and, especially, testing, both teacher-constructed and
standardized.
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With the current emphasis on standardized testing as a measure of school
accountability and evidence of “learning,” the impact of textualization is clear. The
process of constant assessment and commission of the self to text begins as soon as the
child enters the system and the texts that define them follow them throughout their school
careers and on into adulthood. The narrow aspects of the self reflected on the tests can
then be explored and the process of evaluation and categorization becomes perpetual. As
Hayes and Johnson note, “The network of tests, assessments and judgments creates a
paper trail that leads directly to the child. Once the child is tracked within this text there
are many different forms of evaluation that can be made, and verdicts handed down.” (p.
147.)
The textualization that has been exacerbated by the emphasis on testing and the
texts of the school curriculum, as Foucault (1985) demonstrates, is not new. With the
invention and proliferation of print, the bodies of authors could easily be “erased,”
creating a false objectivity. Michael Warner (1983) illustrates how the modern bourgeois
public sphere claimed to have no relation to the body image at all:
Public issues were depersonalized so that, in theory, any person would have the
ability to offer an opinion about them and submit that opinion to the impersonal
test of public debate without personal hazard. Yet the bourgeois public sphere
continued to rely on features of certain bodies. Access to the public came in the
whiteness and maleness that were then denied as forms of positivity, since the
white male qua public person was only abstract rather than white and male (p 382,
quoted in Grumet, 2003).
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This way of thinking persists, and perhaps has even increased, in light of the stringent
requirements of No Child Left Behind. William C. Rhodes (1995) asserts that, “we have
been taught to be spectators, rather than constructors, of knowledge” (458). Rhodes aptly
describes the modernist thought that has continued to dominate educational practice.
This speaks particularly to the way we have viewed learning and teaching; students of all
ages and disciplines have been taught to be the passive recipients of knowledge. We, in
our modernists mindsets, have reified knowledge and used it to define who we are and, in
turn, separate ourselves from other. In terms of the body, we have reified what we have
perceived as “normal” and used it to categorize ourselves in terms of physical difference,
and to write the body out of public education. Moreover, although the testing companies
make an effort to create tests that are reflect a multicultural constituency, the
depersonalized logical/analytical ways of knowing the tests are designed to measure on
still based on white male intellectual ideals. Yet, the judgments and verdicts that can be
made from these tests are virtually endless. Particularly in the case of Attention Deficit
Disorders, the rise in the number of students who qualify as being “disabled” has often
been attributed to the increase in medical “knowledge” about such disabilities, and this
statement exemplifies the significance as well as the isolating potential of textualization:
medical and educational professionals do have more knowledge about such conditions
because of the rise in the pervasiveness and importance of testing that reveals only a
narrow aspect of a student’s being. The more we value one way of demonstrating
knowledge through textualization, which seems to be the unfortunate result of increases
in testing, the more “exceptional” students we will find. With such a model based on
identifying deficiencies based on a very limited scope of understanding, rather than
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knowing more about the students, we actually know less. We learn nothing about who
the student is beyond these limited deficiencies, and the underlying message is that we
are not interested in knowing.
As a result of the emphasis placed on standardized assessment, school reform
advocacy groups like the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development
(ASCD) encourage the utilization of data-analysis to make informed decisions about how
to improve learning. This practice is highly effective in determining the deficiencies of
students based on the narrow standards of the state curriculum, but it reifies the process
of textualization and further distances our educational decisions at an institutional level
from the immediate, lived realities of the students sitting in our classrooms. The concept
of disembodiment through textualization may seem somewhat contradictory; as with
Foucault’s theory on the regulation of sex, the regulation of self occurs not through
complete dismissal, but through persistent and pervasive, even medicalized, examination.
Alan Block (1998) expands on this notion, observing that the school and the curriculum
promote “incarceration by visibility” (p. 327). He explains: “In the school we are defined
by what we know, which is always linked to written reports delimiting that knowledge,
and increasingly, what we know is written by others. We are always to be found by our
position on the well-traveled, well-lit and heavily-marked path which is the curriculum”
(Block, 1998, p. 327). Because our students are transcribed into text, we can analyze
their data and always know where they stand on the achievement continuum, which is
based largely on linear assumptions about the way that children should develop distance
from bodily cognition and move into “higher-level” ways of knowing the world. Just as
each time my daughter visits the pediatrician, she is plotted into a chart based on
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“normal” height and weight, students are carefully tracked based on the volume of the
official curriculum that they can demonstrate knowledge of. Textualization is a
technology operates to make student deficits more visible. This “visibility” offers us
comfort in the form of a commodity, a thing, knowledge, but as Cohen and Weiss (2003)
acknowledge, that visibility does not necessarily produce truth: “Poked, probed, sliced,
prosthetically enhanced and surgically diminished, transplanted, and artificially
stimulated, the body in contemporary culture is the volatile subject of both textual and
material fascination. The explosion of technologies and methodologies that claim to give
us better access to “the truth” of the body have made the body more visible and yet more
elusive. (p. 1).
In addition to standardized testing, the pervasive reliance on textbooks contributes
to the distancing that occurs through textualization. In spite of much discussion about the
need for differentiation and “student-centered” learning, the booming school publishing
industry is an indication that textbooks continue to dominate instruction in many
classrooms. Textbooks are commonly utilized for students as young as first grade, and
some simpler forms of textbooks are used as early as kindergarten. While there are many
interesting and visually pleasing textbook series on the market, the overuse of textbooks
is problematic because it accelerates the textualization process. Students must learn to
relate to the world through the text; the curriculum “represents relations between
students; rather than them forging their own relationship with each other, the curriculum
mediates their relations for them” (Webber, 2003, p. 4). Young children are taught early
on that worthy knowledge comes from beyond their own lived experiences, and that
learning is not really about them, but about the text. Ayers (2001) expresses his
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concerns about most textbooks, describing them as “limited in a thousand ways:
uninteresting, irrelevant, written in a vapid, formulaic style, apparently by a committee of
scholars intent on maximizing sales by offending no one,” which resulted in “a kind of
muzak for the mind – easy listening some of the time, an annoying background buzz
much of the time, catchy but not substantive.” (p. 85). The key word in Ayers’
description is substantive: the textbooks have little substance, they are insubstantial,
disembodied, removed from any obvious physical source, and they are often presented as
the only way to acquire new information.
Those of us who have older children or have taught children older than 7 or 8
know that many, if not most, children find this way of acquiring new information boring.
Learning through text is impersonal, sterile. Drawing on the work of Todd (1997), Hayes
and Johnson (2003) observe, “ Stripping pleasure and desire of all sorts from the school
curriculum leaves school knowledge as one part of an interchangeable and normative
apparatus. This is a disciplining of the body, a process of containing the excesses of the
body by which pleasure and desire are produced” (pp. 152-153). In the town where I live
and work, we have a state funded pre-kindergarten program that is housed in the old
building where I attended Elementary School. When you visit the classrooms there, you
see many wide-eyed children full of wonder, happy to be exploring and learning in an
environment that is designed around their interests and realities. In my experience, I
haven’t known many preschoolers that said they hated school, and this is often the case
for kindergarten. However, once children realize, through testing and grading and
categorizing, what school is “really” about, there is a drastic decline in their enthusiasm.
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Foucault (1985) explains that there is a purpose in the way we make education so
unappealing:
It’s quite an achievement the way teachers manage to make learning unpleasant,
depressing, gray, unerotic! We need to understand how that serves the needs of
society. Imagine what would happen if people got into as big a frenzy about
learning as they do about sex. Crowds shoving and pushing at school doors! It
would be a complete social disaster. You have to make learning so rebarbative if
you want to restrict the number of people who have access to knowledge (p. 52).
The payoff that results from the categorization of textualization is two-fold: it allows us
to privilege certain ways of knowing so that social status can be assigned, and it allows us
to avoid the messy reality of such “frenzied” bodies. Certainly, we could not maintain
the sterile, controlled school environments we are comfortable with if we allowed it to be
so impassioned.
Although the school curriculum has successfully distanced itself from the body
through texts, we have not yet discovered a way for students to be educated in a
traditional classroom without bringing their bodies along. We are teaching bodies; we
enter the classroom with our own corpo-realities (our teaching bodies) to teach bodies,
each with their own set of needs, desires and interests. However, because the body is not
“allowed” in the official curriculum, we must push those contexts into the margins in
order to reveal the depersonalized canon. As Scheman (1997) explains, “The privileged
are precisely those who are defined not by the meanings and uses of their bodies for
others but by their ability either to control their bodies for their own ends or to seem to
exist virtually bodilessly” (p. 351). Through the distancing of the educational process,
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teachers and students must train themselves to keep their bodies at bay; there is no place
for the sensual, the pleasurable, the provocative. The successful teacher must train his or
her body in order to exemplify the posture of teacherly authority: “Not only must
teachers wear clothing considered appropriate, but they must also learn to control facial
expressions, to hold an authoritative stance in the classroom, and to remain decorous.
For most teachers, this bodily discipline becomes automatic” (Jones, 2003, p. 110).
The same type of bodily discipline is expected to become automatic for the
students as well, and if they cannot achieve a certain level of control, we recommend
them for further testing so that we can identify the cause of their perceived deficiency.
Franklin (2003) compares the disembodied educational process for all students to many
women’s experience of initiation into adulthood: “a process of instruction during which
they learn that they must take themselves out of relationship (to their bodies and to
others) in order paradoxically to be in relationship. Be less to be more. Shut down to be
open. Attend but not to this context, this time and place, or these bodies” (p. 19).
In the context of textualization, in the architecture of control, we must shut down
our bodily needs, desires, and impulses to open our minds to learning. This negation of
the body leaves me to wonder, if, as Terry Eagleton asserts, “Aesthetics is born as a
discourse of the body,” where in this impersonal, disembodied environment is art,
pleasure, passion? Hayes and Johnson (2003) lament, in a sentiment that has been
expressed by Peter Applebaum (1995) and Alan Block (1998), “The poetic, the
embodied, the momentary, the emotional, and the pleasurable have been all but purged
from how we think of school knowledge.” If our hope is to prepare students for a future
that holds no promise of poetry, then the curriculum serves us well. We comfort
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ourselves with the belief that we are safely and generically delivering the essential skills,
the cultural capital, that will lead them to become productive citizens. However, we fail
to treat children “as persons with stories to tell and unrealized potentials to be nurtured.
In the guise of preparing children for a better future, we defend ourselves against
knowledge of their current lives that might be painful of disconcerting” (Silin, 2003, p.
14).
Unruly Bodies
There is another, more sinister, spawn of the intertwined discourses of
textualization and bodily discipline. If we have constructed the school as a place where
the body must be in a strict state of discipline, what outlet do we offer to those whose
bodies represent to us instability, uncertainty, disorder? By constructing a category of
normalcy that is based not only a limited view of intelligence but a necessary capability
of bodily restraint, we can differentiate those who can meet those standards (the able)
from those who cannot (the dis-abled). Thus, we must come to understand that we, as
educators, administrators, schools, systems, so on, construct disability. It is not the
physical makeup of our students that render them disabled but the standards by which we
judge them capable of learning. The category of “disabled” is certainly not new, but it
has fluctuated greatly throughout history. The issue of ability first came into play when
American education was in its infancy, and the primary goal was to develop a labor
market. As Ng (2003), explains:
In the development of a progressively elaborated and differentiated labor market,
skills needed in the production process are formalized. Education is a major
mechanism through which people acquire skills, which they sell in exchange for
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wages in the labor market. In standardizing training for paid employment, those
whose learning does not fit into the standardized classroom format are seen as
problematic. Again, we see how something that originates in the social process
becomes a person’s personal attributes. (p. 211).
When we standardize the assessment of students into a very limited way of learning and
knowing, we set ourselves up for exceptions, those that do not fit the model we have
idealized through mandated texts and high-stakes testing. In doing so, we see an
increased need for what we call “special education,” for our “exceptional children,” the
exceptions to the standards we have set.
Special education, like “disability” itself, is not new, but as standards for what
counts as “learning” have become more stringent, those categories have grown to include
more exceptions. In fact, as Foucault (1970) explains in The Order of Things, the
structures of control and bodily discipline were established long before standardized
assessment became an issue, so in the early history of American education, students with
disabilities were easily identified as those that might disrupt the otherwise orderly
learning environment. Furthermore, if early aim of schools was to produce workers,
anyone who couldn’t or shouldn’t perform the jobs the market had to offer (including for
some time women, of course) didn’t belong there. During the early 20th century, some
states passed laws requiring that schools create “special” classes for the “disciplinary”
and “backward,” but it was not until the 1970s that mentally and physically handicapped
students were included in regular classrooms (Spring, 2001).
With the growth of standardized curricula and later, standardized assessment,
came the proliferation of “labels,” or specific categories of disability. These terms
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evolved from “Crippled,” “Deaf,” “Subnormal,” “Prevocational” and “Mentally
Retarded,” to more the more politically correct versions we now employ: HearingImpaired, Learning-Disabled, Emotional-Behavioral Disorder, Attention Deficit
Disorder, Other Health-Impaired. Again, we see the “incarceration of visibility” inherent
in the textualization of the deficits presented by these students: we perceive that by
labeling their deficiencies, we know more about how to “teach” them to respond in the
way that is idealized by the standardized assessment. Ayers (2001) disagrees, as do I,
that the “truths” revealed by labels are illusive: “Labels are limiting. They offer a single
lens concentrated on a specific deficit when what we need are multiple ways of seeing a
child’s ever-changing strengths. All the categories are upside down – they conceal more
than they reveal. They are abstract, when we need is immediate and concrete” (p. 29).
What we need is to know who our students are, their desires, their interests, their
curiosities, how they express themselves, how they perceive themselves, what they bring
to the learning experience. Unfortunately, the message we send, particularly to these
“exceptional” students, is that those aspects of their being are unimportant. In fact,
students in special education often perform well in areas of life outside the standard
classroom, which supports the assertion that disability is, indeed, socially constructed.
For Ng (2003) the construction of disability is particular to the textualized, standardized
school environment:
Instead of treating students’ abilities as given, therefore, we need to interrogate
how they arise in the social organization of the school. We need to analyze how
labeling students as having special needs based on perceptions about their
abilities, seen to be their personal attributes rather than socially produced
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properties, is consequential, not only for their schooling experience, but for their
eventual participation in the labor market (p. 212).
This should force us to question the norm on which the “otherness” of these
characteristics are based. If we look carefully at the disproportionate numbers of students
with disabilities who have already been “othered” based on their race or socioeconomic
status, we can see where the majority of our “exceptions” fall. The pathological
categories we have used to label students are “socially constructed scales used to measure
socially powerless children according to educational criteria that just happen to
characterize the designers of the scales as superior” (Rhodes 1995, 460). If we truly
accepted the notion of democracy, we would understand the bigotry behind the
categorization of students based on standardized assessment. At some point, perhaps
when we became a “Nation At-Risk,” we realized how many students were not successful
in the traditional educational model, but instead of interrogating the tradition and
questioning the elitist norms on which those traditions were based, we began to
aggressively classify those who had different learning needs. Perhaps if we had called
that reality into question, we might have taken steps to change our approach to education
instead of turning to pathology to isolate and “treat” the underachievers along with the
physically disabled students we had already excluded.
I have brought up the issue of special education here because I believe that it is
most symptomatic of the disembodied curriculum, of our desire to shun the complex
issues of difference that surround the vast continuum of humanness. I believe that
thinking through issues of the body’s place in the curriculum requires us to interrogate
disability, to own the injustices we have wrought because of our desires for the neatness

57

and order of controlled educational environments. As Holmes (2003) suggests, disability
is not something that we want to confront, it makes visible that which will not be
disappeared: the body and its sensations and needs, not all of which involve jouissance, at
least not in the relatively limited terms imagined by non-disabled culture. Disability also
makes visible that which must disappear, despite our best efforts: the body that is
impermanent and will die (p. x). Rather than face these uncertainties, we have, for much
of the history of American education marginalized these “others” who did not meet our
standards; disorderly, disadvantaged, discarded, disabled. These injustices have not gone
entirely unnoticed: On December 13, 1993, the cover of U.S. News and World Report
touted the headline: SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL – How Special Education Programs
are Cheating Our Children and Costing Taxpayers Billions Each Year.” The article was
published at a time when the public was taking notice of the continued failure of special
education programs across the country to demonstrate any meaningful progress. Such
outspoken concern over the effectiveness of special education has led to some
reorganization in special education, particularly an emphasis on including special
education students in the regular classroom. The inclusion of special education students
rests on the premise that these students should not be denied access to the appropriate
grade-level curriculum their peers receive and that they should be guaranteed, as federal
law now mandates, the “least restrictive” environment possible. However, this solution
still overlooks the underlying issue of otherness when it comes to teaching and learning.
A child who was removed from a “regular” education classroom because she could not
learn the material the way it was being taught is not going to “magically” learn the
material just because she is placed back in with peers her age if the same preconceived
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notions about disability and otherness exist. We think we can “normalize” her disability
through inclusion, but she will continue to be denied access to the cultural currency her
school has to offer as long as a “one-size fits all” approach is perpetuated.
In recent years, theories of multiple intelligences, advocated primarily by Gardner
(1983) and Thomas Armstrong (1999) have helped to decentralize the “sit and get”
approach that dominated instruction for so long. In fact, as Georgia has begun the
process of adopting its new performance standards, “differentiation” according to
learning style, interest and readiness has been emphasized. However, in many cases, “sit
and get” has simply become “sit/stand/dance/sing/draw or write and get.” In other words,
we have found different ways for students to internalize the information that we are
passing down to them, but the underlying perception of how we learn, the need to remand
ourselves to the text, has remained unchanged.
In the disembodied curriculum, we have placed development, issues of the body,
in a one category and the transmission of information in another. We have clung to the
passive model of education, a model that requires us to disconnect our minds from our
bodies in order to be informed, shut down to be open. Cummins (2003) aptly describes
what is missing in this approach, a pedagogy of indifference where embodied,
meaningful learning is concerned:
Nowhere in this anemic instructional vision is there room for really connecting at
a human level with culturally diverse students; consigned to irrelevance also is
any notion of affirming students’ identities, and challenging coercive power
structures, by activating what they already know about the world and mobilizing
the intellectual and linguistic tools they use to make sense of their worlds. This
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kind of programming reduces instruction to a technical exercise. No role is
envisaged for teachers or students to invest their identities (affect, intellect, and
imagination) in the teaching/learning process (p. 56).
As I have detailed here, and as Cummins makes clear, the human element of embodied
teaching and learning is largely missing from the standardized curricula, sterilized and
often segregated classrooms, and impersonal instructional methods that characterize
American education. The disembodiment of curriculum has not only left us confused
about where our own bodily realities fit within the architecture of control but has also
reified the persistent devaluing of those embodied and “disabled” knowing. At what
point will our isolation bring us to resurrect the body in the curriculum? When will we
have the courage to rethink the body’s role in our subjectivities, to re-imagine “normal?”
Bringing our bodies out of the margins of our academic identities and into the foreground
will challenge us to think through the one identity category that no one chooses. Martha
Stoddard Holmes (2003) provides an example of the difficulties we face in confronting
questions of the body. She found that “[t]rying to work out the relationships between
disabled bodies and non-disabled ones made my students feel vulnerable because it was
literally unimagined territory. They imagined they would date and marry a non-disabled
person who would stay that way; they imagined they would always be non-disabled.
(Holmes, 2003, viii). We need to broaden our imaginations and embrace the instability of
the disabled/ able continuum if we hope to make education more meaningful, more
personal. Toward that end, as teachers, students and scholars, we need “more situated,
theoretically nuanced analyses of bodies and feelings that honor their social, intersubjective and historical status and engage our actual lives in our feeling bodies”
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(Holmes, p. xi, 2003). With this project, I, in my temporarily-able body, join many
impassioned, embodied inquiries of those who have preceded me into the field of
disability studies in attempting to meet that need.
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CHAPTER 3
LIFE GOES ON:
DISABILITY, CURRICULUM AND POPULAR CULTURE
It seems to me that it was quite by accident that I stumbled upon the realm of
disability studies while writing my doctoral dissertation on the relationships between
curriculum and the body. I think doctoral students, hoping to find a niche for themselves
within their respective fields, are always on the lookout for new directions in theory, new
ways of understanding and articulating our own insights into scholarship. As I began
reading, I became intrigued by what Lennard Davis (1995) calls the “strange and really
unaccountable silence” about the issue of disability in academic discourse. Davis writes:
The silence is stranger, too, since so much of the left criticism has devoted itself
to the issue of the body, of the social construction of sexuality and gender.
Alternative bodies people this discourse: gay, lesbian, hermaphrodite, criminal,
medical, and so on. But lurking behind these images of transgression and
deviance is a much more transgressive and deviant figure: the disabled body (p.
5).
As I pondered my own understanding of that “transgressive and deviant figure” and
became immersed in the literature of disability studies, I have found myself feeling as
though I might have, at least for a time, found a theoretical home that makes sense to me.
I find here theorists asking questions that resonate with my own confusions, questions
like those Martha Stoddard Holmes (2003) asks in her opening to Fictions of Affliction:
What kind of bodies are represented as feeling bodies – stocked with pain,
sympathy, disgust, desire, and laughter, not just blood, organs, tissues, nerves, and
muscles? Why, and in what contexts, do we read our won or others’ physical
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bodies as slates on which feelings are writ large, or as markers in an emotional
landscape? What cultural texts inform those readings, what intelligence guides
them, and what power do they wield (and for whom)? (p. vii).
These are the questions I seek to stir through an analysis of popular culture.
But let me be completely honest about why I am writing about disability.
I am obsessed with my body. I weigh myself every day (sometimes twice). I
examine my body in the mirror most mornings, but not before mentally preparing myself
for disappointment. I spend hours reading up on different diets and meticulously
planning meals. I can’t not think about my body. But sometimes the ridiculousness of
my obsession occurs to me when I realize how closely my body reflects the physical
norms of American society: five feet six inches, 36/30/36, 126 pounds, with a million
parts, limbs, organs, cells, almost perfectly in place. That’s when the what-ifs come into
play. What if suddenly I find myself inhabiting a body that in some way doesn’t live up
to society’s expectations? I am extremely near-sighted, and I used to have nightmares
about waking up in the middle of the night to find that I had gone blind. One of my
biggest fears throughout my life has been disfigurement by burning. Every time a joint
aches or a bump appears, I rush to the internet to check my symptoms for signs of some
dreaded disease.
So, regardless of how accepting I have become of other’s differences in my own
experience, I have to admit that bodily norms have clearly had a profound affect on both
my perceptions of bodies and my physical body itself. These are the norms of an ableist
culture, a society that has allowed disabilities and disfigurements to be read as other,
strange, or in Freud’s (1963) term, “uncanny.” Freud (1963) says “this uncanny is in
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reality nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the
mind and which has become, alienated from it only through the process of repression” (p.
240). Perhaps then, our perceptions of disabled bodies can be traced to our own fears
about the degeneration of our own bodies through disease, accident, or aging. For me,
interrogating how our (or perhaps I should say my) culture of ableism has constructed
disability forces me to confront these fears and confusions I have about bodily normalcy.
At 30, I think it’s time that I come to terms with the conceptual turmoil that has
dominated most of my lived experience. Why look to popular culture? Davis (1995)
says “Disability is a specular moment. The power of the gaze is to control, limit and
patrol how the person is brought to the fore. Accompanying the gaze are a welter of
powerful emotional responses. These responses can include horror, fear, pity,
compassion and avoidance” (p. 12). For me, the significance of popular culture is
“specular,” because here we are afforded a (almost) guiltless gaze, because in my mind
are the indelible images of the impossibly thin, seductive women that years of avid
television watching and magazine reading have left behind. And if my immersion in
popular media can speak volumes about my own desires for normalcy, it must have
something important to say about my perceptions of disability. Furthermore, if we take
seriously the profound presence of popular culture in American society, then we must
accept that the media that we engage in shapes our assumptions about disability.
I want to explore popular, particularly cinematic, representations of disability
because, as Giroux and Simon (1989) note, “Popular culture represents a significant
pedagogical site that raises important questions about the relevance of everyday life,
student voice, and the investments of meaning and pleasure that structure and anchor the
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why and how of learning (p. 5). I believe that popular culture raises particularly relevant
questions about the way that we have constructed disability and excluded bodies from the
curriculum based on this otherness. As Daspit (2000) asserts, “Curricular appropriation
of popular culture may assist in reorganizing the prevailing narratives that schooling has
perpetuated” (p. 165). Here, I appropriate popular culture to investigate how
representations of disability have assisted in organizing prevailing narratives of disability
in educational settings and offer critical readings of some particular texts in at attempt to
reorganize those narratives.
Writing Disabled Bodies
In order to understand how perceptions of disability have operated to impact our
collective decisions regarding education environments, we must further investigate the
ways the popular culture has “written” the disabled body. Norden points out the
significance of popular representations, particularly films, have operated to construct and
objectify disability (1994):
By encouraging audience members to perceive the world depicted in the moves,
and by implication the world in general, from this perspective and thus associate
themselves with able-bodied characters, this strategy has a two-fold effect: it
enhances the disabled characters’ isolation and “Otherness” by reducing them to
objectifications of pity, fear, scorn, etc. – in short, objects of spectacle – as a
means of pandering to the needs of the able-bodied majority, and it contributes to
a sense of isolation and self-loathing among audience members with disabilities
(p. 1).
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I believe that the narratives of isolation and otherness highlighted by Norden offer insight
into the way have organized a disembodied school curriculum that allows the exclusion
of particular bodies based on the assignment of disability. My intention here is not to
apologize for or justify my own bodily egoism or to evoke sympathy for people with
disabilities by exposing and examining the ways American popular culture has
conceptualized disability in sometimes subtle and particularly damaging ways. Rather, I
look to gain insight into the culturally and historically situated bodies of the differentlyabled by investigating contemporary popular culture (specifically, films and television)
with the same question Holmes (2003) asked of Victorian literature: “What are the
longer-term effects of the coding of all of our bodies – through the recurrent stories that
shape our social relations – as bodies instructed to feel in limited ways?” (p. vii). Here,
those “longer-term” effects include the individual and collective perceptions of disability
through the embedded curriculum of popular culture as well as the development of the
official curriculum that has dominated education in the 20th century and has excluded
disabled students in multiple ways.
Jenkins, McPherson, and Shattuc (2002) observe that when it comes to analyzing
the media, the challenge is “to write about out own multiple (and often contradictory)
involvements, participations, engagements, and identifications with popular culture –
without denying, rationalizing, and distorting them. The best cultural critics speak as
“insiders” as well as “outsiders” (p. 7). It is difficult to write about disabled bodies and
representations of disabled bodies without inadvertently engaging the same pathologies
and voyeurisms in which those representations were constructed because, as Snyder and
Mitchell (2001) observe, there is no “sensual and sensory language to theorize the body
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itself” (p. 381). Even the term itself, “disability,” a term which itself constructs a binary
between the able and “dis” able, does not adequately represent the continuum of physical
and/or mental abilities that can be discussed. However, I attempt to meet that challenge
by writing as a participant in the social construction of disability (through my
internalization of bodily norms) and both a consumer and a critic of cultural
representations of disability (which can encompass a vast continuum of physical and/or
mental ability), in order to better understand those involvements, participations,
engagements, and identifications from the perspective of the able-bodied.
Let me begin by highlighting an example of the contradictions posed by
contemporary representations of disability. When I began to think about the ways that
people with disabilities had been portrayed in my own experience of popular culture, I
thought of Corky. In the television series, Life Goes On, which aired on ABC from 1989
to 1993, the lovable lead character, teenager Corky Thatcher, was “mainstreamed” into a
regular school with his sympathetic “normal” peers. The actor who played Corky, Chris
Burke, emerged not long after the mainstreaming “movement” had taken hold. Burke
also had Down's syndrome, a relative first for American television, and a subject of
considerable media coverage. Although Corky marked an important milestone for
representations of the disabled, he might not be the first image that comes to mind for
most Americans, but for me, Down’s Syndrome loomed ever present in my
understanding of disability. Corky reminded me of my older twin cousins, who lived just
down the road from my childhood home. He also brought to mind the teenager my best
friend’s mother, an interpreter for the hearing-impaired and an advocate for those who
our society categorized “special,” had informally adopted as part of her family. While the
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show presented Corky as a disabled person living the “normal” life of a teenager, it
perpetuated notions of the disabled as pitiful and innocent. It also minimized the stigma
that still characterized the experience of students with Down’s Syndrome and other
diagnoses that deemed them “disabled.”
The series was not unlike many other contemporary films, television series, and
popular comic strips, explored in this chapter, which often seemed to portray disability in
a positive light but carried an underlying message about the “otherness” of the disabled.
More importantly, the series served to deemphasize in the public consciousness the (often
grim) “reality” of living as a student with disabilities. While the able-bodied community
heralded the series as a positive exemplar of the inclusive American sitcom, millions of
real American students with Down’s Syndrome and a host of other disabilities spent their
days in the isolation of special education “resource” rooms. While the relative popularity
of Life Goes On seems to express a certain mindset about the need for an inclusive
curriculum, the history of American education tells another story entirely, and the “dark
past” of “special” education leaves little uncertainty that disabled bodies have been
purposefully excluded from the curriculum.
Before I discuss other popular representations of disability, I want to situate these
images within a broader understanding of the social experiences of people with
disabilities. Like Jenkins, Richardson, and Shattuc (2002), I view these popular texts
“not as discrete entities that stand alone but instead exist in relation to a broad range of
other discourses, placing media production and consumption within a vast social and
cultural configuration of competing voices and positions” (p. 17). Therefore, it is
important that we recognize the exclusion of people with disabilities from “mainstream”
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society (particularly education) for what it was and, in some cases, still is: purposeful and
appalling. It is well-known that for nearly a century, the needs of students with
disabilities were overlooked or ignored by public schools, relegated to the margins,
isolated. I don’t need to retell the history of institutionalization here; you are undoubtedly
aware of the way that disabled children, particularly those whose physical abnormalities
were accompanied by intellectual ones, were relegated to the margins of society, cast
away, imprisoned. But let Winzer’s (1993) collection of statistics from her
comprehensive study of the history of Special Education serve to remind us:
In 1966 in the United States the per capita cost for mentally retarded persons in
residential settings was less than five dollars a day (Holburn, 1990). Writers
presented horrifying illustrated descriptions of conditions in institutions for
mentally retarded person and juvenile delinquents (Blatt and Kaplan, 1960;
Rivera, 1972; Vail, 1966). Photographs showed poorly clothed or naked
residents, residents in solitary rooms, and large, loudly day rooms smeared with
excrement on walls, floors and even ceilings (Zigler, Hoddap, and Edison, 1990).
These “poignant exposes revealed the frequent tragedies in the human condition”
(Sparr and Smith, 1990), p. 95). Blatt described institutions for the mentally
retarded as a “land of the living dead” (Blatt and Kaplan, 1960, p. v). (Winzer
1993, p. 378)
Such disturbing images have characterized the “treatment” of students with
disabilities for much of the history of public education. In fact, in spite of the mandate for
inclusion put forth by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 1975, it is
really only in the last decade that we have seen a significant shift toward fully including
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students with disabilities in the regular classroom and providing for them the same
opportunities that “normal” children are entitled to. By the early 1990s, when Life Goes
On was reassuring Americans that special education students could take active roles in
mainstream society, there was nothing that could really be deemed “integration,” in the
language of the Civil rights movement. Winzer (1993) recognizes a paradigm shift was
(and I would argue is still) necessary before significant changes could take place,
observing that “the ability of a society to provide services to help special people required
not only the technical and scientific skills to do so, but also a social philosophy that
recognized exceptionality as a human condition, not simplistically as deviance,
dependence, or delinquency (p. 365).” Yet, as Winzer (1993) concludes her study,
writing just over a decade ago, we find that her concept of changed social philosophy
reflects humane changes in policy but still embodies the same ideas about the need to
rehabilitate the disabled toward normalcy:
The current philosophy underlying special education rejects the idea of merely
caring for or maintaining persons with disabilities or simply helping them to
adjust. Instead, it stresses corrections and prevention and adheres to the notion
that all children have the right to learn in the educational environment most suited
to their academic and social needs (p. 383).
Unfortunately, the educational environment that is most often deemed “most
suited” to their needs is a separate “special” environment that further stigmatizes these
students, and the notion of “correction and prevention,” still highly applicable to the
“treatment” of children with disabilities, perpetuates the hegemony of able-bodied
culture. These ideas resonate in what Eli Clare (2001) identifies as four paradigms of
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disability that have dominated popular perception: the medical, charity, supercrip, and
moral models. Clare’s (2001) terms represent the prevailing ways that able-bodied
American society has responded to disability. The “medical” model presents disability as
a pathological condition that must be treated or cured through medical technology so that
the person can live a “normal” life; the new ABC reality show “Miracle Workers,” in
which patients with serious medical conditions receive expensive “life-changing”
medical procedures for free, is good evidence of the prevalence of this assumption. In
the tradition of the long-running Jerry Lewis Telethon, the “charity” model emphasizes
the need to eradicate disabling conditions through generous giving by others. The
“supercrip” model depicts the person with a disability as heroic and courageous for
becoming successful or simply living in spite of his or her condition (think Helen Keller,
F.D.R, Ray Charles, etc.) and the “moral” model, by Clare’s definition, associates
disability with moral weakness or depravity (which corresponds with Martin Norden’s
(1994) “Obsessive Avenger,” an embittered character seeking revenge). I would add that
the “moral” model might also include the aggrandizement of the individual to a higher
moral plane based on his or her disability, as in the staple characters described by Norden
(1994), the “Sweet Innocent” and the “Saintly Sage.”
From my own analysis of popular media, I would add what I will call the
“spectacle” model, in which the disabled body is viewed as exotic or grotesque, which
brings to mind various media that conflate the “otherness” of disability with “horror.”
This model is closely tied to another representation, the “comic” model, in which
disabling conditions are depicted humorously. In recent years, this model has been
popularized by syndicated comic artists like Gahan Wilson, whose dark images of half-
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dead, macabre, grotesque “monsters” of all sorts (very reminiscent of early horror films),
have appeared in the New Yorker and other popular periodicals for decades. The cartoons
of John Callahan, a quadriplegic who became known for his controversial “cripple
humor” cartoons, and The Far Side creator Gary Larson, whose fictional realm is
occupied entirely by bulging-eyed, big-nosed, bespectacled, misshapen, and often
clueless characters, have also sparked heated debates about their comic representations of
disability.
These categories, indicative of some of the most common assumptions about
disability, are not all-inclusive and, as Clare (2001) is quick to note, they intersect and
overlap, but they can give us some idea of the multiple ways that disability is
conceptualized through contemporary popular culture. They can also help us understand
how these narratives operate to define disability in these popular media. Holmes (2003)
observes that they “teach us that disability is “alien, terrifying, tragic; that it transforms
your life in overwhelmingly negative ways; and that it is normal to feel horrified,
relieved, and inspired, all from a safe distance, when we encounter disability (Holmes,
2003, p. ix.). Here, I want to revisit some disability films that, for me, have most
horrified, relieved and inspired my understanding of what it means to be disabled.
Disability in Film and Television
Let me begin by briefly describing the historical context that preceded the making
of these recent films. As we will see, disability has been and continues to be big
business when it comes to the film industry; as Davis (2002) notes, three of the academy
award nominated films of 1997 - Shine, The English Patient, and Slingblade – were all
disability films. Not long after films emerged as a medium in America, filmmakers
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began capitalizing on the comic model to release a number of short silent films that
featured disabled characters. As Safran (1998) notes, “Many early movies used
disabilities to heighten the effect of slapstick comedies and melodramas, and frequently
presented the stereotypes of victim or villain, or as seeking revenge for their disability”
(p. 468). In fact, the first short film depicting physical disability, Thomas Edison’s 50second film, The Fake Beggar, appeared in 1898 (Norden, 1994). The early titles speak
for themselves: The Legless Runner (1907), The Invalid’s Adventure (1907), and Don’t
Pull My Leg (1908). An indication of the popularity of this genre, during this era of the
early development of the film industry, the famed D.W. Griffith directed no less than 14
films featuring physical and/or sensory impairments (Safran, 1998).
As the American film industry matured and the general public became more
sensitive toward the body-altering injuries sustained by soldiers in World War I, the
medical model became the most popular mode of filmic representations of disability. A
barrage of “curability” film, including The Silent Voice (1915), Stella Maris (1918), The
Miracle Man (1919), Big Little Person (1919) and The Shock (1923), all of which
featured miraculous recoveries, typify the films of this period. The medical model, which
insists that the body be “fixed” in order to restore it to its “normal” state, is perhaps the
most pervasive, considering the pathologization of disability:
Briefly, the medicalization of disability casts human variation as deviance from
the norm, as pathological condition, as deficit, and significantly, as an individual
burden and personal tragedy. Society, in agreeing to assign medical meaning to
disability, colludes to keep the issue within the purview of the medical
establishment, to keep it a personal matter and “treat” the condition and the
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person with the condition rather than “treating” the social processes and policies
that construct disabled people’s lives (Linton, 1998, p. 11).
In spite of the popularity of the medical representations of disability during this time,
some films emerged that expressed underlying messages about the association between
disability and depravity, such as Flesh and Blood (1922), in which the main character
disguises himself as a disabled beggar, The Blackbird (1926), whose main character is an
underworld gang leader posing as a disabled Bishop, and The Unknown (1927), which
features a armless “freak” show “fake” whose deceit results in the amputation of both his
arms.
Silent film actor Lon Chaney, who played the main characters in each of these
three films and a host of others, was well-known for his portrayal of strange, disfigured,
and disabled (or seemingly disabled) characters, and it was he who portrayed the title
characters in the first film versions of The Hunchback of Notre Dame (1923) and The
Phantom of the Opera (1925), perhaps two of the most well-known representations of
disfigurement. The popularity of these films signaled a gradual shift from a subtle,
underlying association of disability with immorality to brazen depictions of disability as
spectacle. With this shift came the emergence of horror films such as Frankenstein
(1931) and Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1931) and Freaks (1932). In general, the films of
the early decades of the twentieth century helped to construct disability in terms of
dependence and deviance:
Moviemakers would have their audiences believe that helplessness and
dependency on ablebodied people were the norms for physically disabled people,
and that if they weren’t cured, or at the very least kept dependent, they were
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dangerous deviants. If in the movies disabled characters showed their worthiness
through some combination of good deeds, innocence, spirituality, and a general
long-suffering life, and weren’t elderly, they would probably return to the
mainstream world – their ultimate “reward,” as it were – through a cure (Norden,
1994, p. 105-106).
The World War II era ushered in more sensitive portrayals, reminiscent of both
the “medical” and “supercrip” trends in response to the growing number of disabled
veterans: Pride of the Marines (1945) and Bright Victory (1951) both featured characters
blinded in service. In The Best Years of Our Lives (1946) veteran Harold Russell, whose
hands had been replaced by metal hooks, portrayed himself. Another well-known film,
Fred Zinnemann’s The Men (1950), depicted veterans who had become paraplegics
(Norden, 1994). These films tended to be hopeful depictions of people coming to terms
with their disabilities, relying also on the assumptions that disability is overcome through
the selfless giving (charity) of others (in most cases, beautiful women). Other later “feelgood” films, including Interrupted Melody (1955), the true story of opera singer Marjorie
Lawrence overcoming polio, and Sunrise at Campobello (1960), which chronicled
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s polio “triumph,” followed this medical/ supercrip model. The
story of Helen Keller, The Miracle Worker (1962), which details how Keller
miraculously manages to overcome multiple disabilities to eke out some semblance of a
“normal” existence, is yet another example.
In contrast, the long Vietnam era sparked its own collection of disability
depictions, but these films had a decidedly different tone. The well-known Stanley
Kubrick film, Dr. Strangelove (1964), with its unforgettable portrayal of the maniacal

75

wheelchair-bound Dr. with the mechanical arm, was among the first of many anti-war
themed films. By relating these images of disability to the controversial Vietnam conflict,
these films offered a subtle moral message: both Johnny Got His Gun (1971) and Coming
Home (1978), as well as the later Born on the Fourth of July (1989), offered grim
depictions of physical disability and an anti-war message. In response to the increased
number of soldiers experiencing “psychological” casualties as a result of the war, the
post-Vietnam era saw a flood of films that addressed mental disabilities in frightening
and macabre portrayals, including One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975), Taxi Driver
(1976), The Other Side of Hell (1978), The Deer Hunter (1978) and Apocalypse Now
(1979).
Interestingly enough, films with disability themes rarely featured children with
disabilities, and it wasn’t until the civil rights era was well underway that people with
disabilities were consistently depicted as living independently in “mainstream” society in
films like Tell Me That You Love Me Junie Moon (1970), in which a woman disfigured
by burns ventures out into society with her two disabled friends. This period also saw a
resurgence of “disabled hero” themes with films such as The Other Side of the Mountain
(1975), in which a champion skier comes to terms with paralysis.
It was also during this era that people with disabilities began to make their way
onto the small screen. In the years that preceded the civil rights era, as television
established itself as the new medium for the masses, Chester Goode, the loyal deputy on
the first nine seasons of Gunsmoke (1955-1975) was only noteworthy representation of
disability. In 1967, we saw the first character with a disability in a title role in the
Wheelchair dependent detective, Robert T. Ironside in Ironside (1967-1975). A few
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years later, he was joined by James Fransiscus, a blind insurance investigator on
Longstreet (1971-1972). Each of these characters ascribe to “supercrip” assumptions
about disability, and it is interesting to note that none of these three popular characters
suffered from a congenital condition, but received the injuries that led to their disabilities
at the hands of others.
Similarly, former astronaut Steve Austin, The Six Million Dollar Man (19741978) became disabled as a result of a spaceship crash, but was able to obtain
superhuman qualities by being rebuilt as a cyborg. The popular series spawned a spin-off
involving his former love-interest, Jaime Sommers, in The Bionic Woman (1976-1978).
Sommers’ body was also rebuilt after a near-fatal sky-diving accident. Perhaps the only
congenitally disabled recurring character was the blind chief Engineer Lt. Geordi
LaForge, who appeared in Star Trek: The Next Generation (1987-1994) and subsequent
films. LaForge’s disabililty was “corrected” through technology; he wore a futuristic
device called a V.I.S.O.R. (Visual Instrument and Sensory Organ Replacement), which
enabled him to see a broader range of electromagnetic radiation than most humans, but he
eventually received ocular implants that allowed him to discontinue the use of the device
and regain a “normal” appearance. These development of these characters primarily
about medical assumptions about disability; they imply that the characters’ quality of life
would have suffered if not for the ability-enhancing technology that transformed them
into bionic superheroes.
Beyond these few enduring characters, there have been a few other notable roles
actually portrayed by actors with disabilities, including Chris Burke and Marlee Matlin,
who, after winning an Oscar for her role in Children of a Lesser God, joined the TV
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series Picket Fences (1992-1996). In general, however, people with disabilities have
been largely underrepresented on television. While the ongoing debate over the
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 moved disability rights further into the public
consciousness, this shift was not reflected in the television industry, and this continues to
be the case. The two noteworthy characters currently appearing in successful series, Dr.
David Robbins on the CBS drama, CSI, and Dr. Gregory House on the Fox series, House,
both walk with a limp and use a cane. While the disability of Dr. David Robbins (played
by Robert David Hall, an actual double amputee) is not significant to the story line, the
disabling injury of Dr. House is a major part of the conflict involving this embittered
physician, who suffers from chronic pain. Considering the vast numbers of Americans
who have disabilities, which Davis (2002) estimates to be 15 to 20 percent of the
population even without the baby boomers, two doctors with canes grossly minimizes the
presence of people with disabilities in our country.
While disabled characters remain largely absent from television, films have
continued to draw on the standard assumptions about disability in the numerous
representations that have appeared since the 1980s. One of the most memorable images
from my childhood was that of The Elephant Man (1980), with its grotesque
representation of disfigurement and underlying message about charity. Since that time, a
myriad of motion pictures have depicted a wide range of disabilities: autism in Rain Man
(1988) and What’s Eating Gilbert Grape (1993), AIDS in Philadelphia (1993), blindness
in At First Sight (1997) and Ray (2004), disfigurement in The English Patient (1993), The
Man Without a Face (1993) and Vanilla Sky (2001), cancer in One True Thing (1998) and
Stepmom (1998), congenital physical conditions in Simon Birch (1998) and The Mighty
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(1998) and learning disabilities in Sling Blade (1996) and I Am Sam (2001), and the list
could continue on for several pages. The depictions of people with disabilities in these
films are as varied as the conditions they address, ranging from asexual innocence to
angry bittnerness to deviant immorality, and while many of them attempt to do justice to
disability in their realistic representations, most still seem to embody one or more of the
traditional assumptions about disability.
Edward Scissorhands
Within this group of contemporary disability films are two figures that loom large
in the collective cultural consciousness and in my personal mental inventory of disability
representations. The first is Edward Scissorhands (1990), which might easily be
regarded as the Generation X’s Frankenstein with a sensitive, comic twist. This Tim
Burton film was released just as I preparing to enter the cruel, strange world of high
school, a time when adolescent fears of isolation and “otherness” were reaching their
zenith. Perhaps it was both this timeliness and later, the film’s enduring presence on
TBS, that made the images of Edward’s garden-shear hands, sunken eyes, and wiry mess
of black hair so unforgettable. As an “artificial” person, Scissorhands may not, on first
glance, appear to portray traditional notions of disability, but as Enns and Smit (2001)
point out, disability does not have an easily recognized, coherent form. Rather, the
disability is defined in relation to what is perceived as a lack of human potential, so that
the category of disability becomes a distorted reflection of what society considers
“normal” and “human.” Scissorhands certainly provides a telling reflection of
assumptions about humanity and normalcy. Edward is the creation of an ambitious
inventor who died before he could craft hands to replace the set of rotating scissors. He
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exists happily in complete isolation in the Gothic mansion belonging to his creator, but
his problems begin when Peg Boggs stops by on an Avon sales call. Boggs takes pity on
him and brings him home with her to 1950s Suburbia. At first, Edward finds himself
subject to the fearful and curious scrutiny of the neighborhood, but his shrub and haircutting talents quickly elevate him to celebrity status. However, Edward’s experience in
mainstream society soon takes a negative turn; his love for Peg’s daughter, Kim, is
unrequited, and an accident in which he unintentionally harms another person is
interpreted as a malicious act, forcing him to return to exile indefinitely.
Norden (1994), in his comprehensive history of physical disability in films, gives
American film the moniker, “Cinema of Isolation,” because more often than not,
characters with disabilities are set apart, portrayed as outsiders. This is certainly true of
Edward Scissorhands and many of the other films mentioned here. Edward Scissorhands
also embodies a number of other traditional assumptions about disabled bodies and what
it means to be “normal.” Peg feels sorry for Edward, and it is her charity that brings him
into Suburbia, based on Burton’s own childhood Burbank, which he describes as
“disembodied” (Ansen, 1991). Edward quickly becomes a spectacle, a “freak” to be
studied by the curious eyes of the “normal” people, but his unique talents make him a
hero (supercrip). However, Edward, longing so much to touch, to engage in normalcy, is
unable to control his disability, and his weakness is interpreted by society as depravity.
Caroline Thompson, the screenwriter for the film, says of Burton’s character in
Newsweek, “It’s the perfect metaphor for how many of us feel. It’s more than feeling like
an outsider, it’s feeling dangerous . . . yearning to touch and knowing when you do, you
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destroy” (Ansen, 1991). In the end, we are left wondering if he would have been better
off left in isolation, where society felt he really “belonged” in the first place.
In my initial readings of this film, I perceived primarily the pain and isolation that
accompanied Edward’s otherness, and those feelings appealed to my own insecurities
about navigating the murky waters between what I have understood as the isolation of
intellectualism and the attachment to mainstream cultural norms. However, I think that
Edward Scissorhands holds some important insights into the way we construct disability
and how those constructions operate in an environment that is similar to Burton’s
disembodied Suburbia, namely, the school. The neighborhood of neatly situated, tackily
decorated tract homes is not unlike the sterile classroom, with its neatly-lined desks and
pre-fabricated posters. Edward, with his childlike uncertainty, unsteady gait, black attire,
and complicated appendages, stands out monstrously against this backdrop of repressed
tidiness. Like Edward, students with disabilities, particularly perceived physical and
mental differences, complicate the “tidy” environment of the “regular” classroom. Like
Edward’s human hosts, we are fearful and suspicious of “others” who cannot control their
minds and bodies the way that the able do; we may “tolerate” those that are different but,
like Edward’s friends, our apparent friendship may only be a mask for our underlying
fear and misunderstanding. Edward is truly “disabled” in the Suburban environment,
with its numerous physical and social barriers. From Edward’s demise we learn that
having the appearance of accepting difference is not the same as embracing difference
and changing the fabric of society to allow for those differences.
Burton, himself a self-proclaimed alienated artist, clearly has something to say
about the way American society responds to difference, with his construction of “an
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uneasy sense that the surface gregariousness of middle-class life can quickly turn
threatening” (Ansen, 1991, p. 58). Yet, the viewing audience is left to accept Edward’s
fate and to understand physical difference as “alien, terrifying, tragic,” to assume that
those who fail to embrace the nuances of disembodied normalcy (in which bodily
entanglements are kept at a safe distance), those whose differences are beyond their
control, should be kept in isolation. We comfort ourselves with the assumption that
students with disabilities are better off not being exposed to the selfishness,
maliciousness, and fearfulness of mainstream society.
Forrest Gump
Another unforgettable character, Forrest Gump (1994), shares Scissorhands’
naiveté about the brutish qualities of mainstream society, but his narrative follows a
somewhat different path. This huge box-office hit centers on the life of a mildly mentally
(and in the beginning, physically) disabled Alabama man who wanders innocently
through the major historical events of the 60s and 70s and inadvertently finds personal
and financial success. Like Edward, Forrest embodies more than one of the traditional
assumptions about people with disabilities. When we first meet Forrest, we find that, in
keeping with the “medical” model of disability, he must endure painful leg braces in
order to straighten his legs and allow for a “normal” appearance. The braces, in turn, are
an outwardly visible sign of his disabilities and cause him to become a spectacle, an
object of ridicule by cruel children and adults alike. Nevertheless, Forrest is blissfully
unaware of the malice and disgust with which he is regarded, and in contrast to
Scissorhands, whose lack of understanding and restraint results in questionable moralilty,
Gump is morally elevated as a result of his simplicity, the archetype of Norden’s (1994)
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“Sweet Innnocent.” Unlike Scissorhands, who eyes are inevitably opened to the cruelty of
humanity, Forrest remains oblivious to reality, and the other characters go to great length
to protect his child-like “purity”; his mother even sleeps with the school superintendent to
keep him in a regular classroom. Her desperate act emphasizes her desire to maintain
Forrest’s persona of normalcy, whatever the cost. In fact, while Forrest is viewed as the
epitome of a “good” person because he lacks the ability to impose judgment on others, he
never has to make any moral choices like those faced by other characters in the film.
Like Peg, it is primarily a mainstream mother-figure, Jenny, who offers charity in the
form of friendship, and like Edward, it is Forrest’s special “talents” (in this case, his
knack for running and ping-pong) that propel him into celebrity (supercrip) status.
Forrest also falls in love in the film, and although his childlike adoration for Jenny offers
none of the complexities of “normal” adult relationships, he does eventually (although
somewhat inadvertently, consummate his relationship with her, resulting in a child (who,
incidentally does not share Forrest’s disability).
Isolation and Inclusion
When juxtaposed, these two characters construct a telling binary between two
major issues in special education: isolation and inclusion. The message that these two
films seem to offer is that the inclusion of people with disabilities into mainstream
society can work if those people have an outwardly “normal” appearance, are innocent
and asexual, require no adaptations, and pose no threat to our own insecurities about
ourselves. The two characters, both framed as outsiders, are radically different in the
ways that they navigate mainstream society. Edward is acutely aware of the fact that the
scissors make him different, and his awareness only further inhibits him from engaging in
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appropriate social interactions. He also engages in purposeful moral choices, although
those choices only lead him to discover the pain of betrayal and deceit, and result in his
loss of innocence. Once corrupted, he is no longer “good” in the eyes of the Suburbanites
and must return to isolation.
In comparison, Forrest Gump certainly seems to convey the more positive
message about accepting difference, but that acceptance comes with a price. In Forrest’s
case, the success of his mainstream experiences seem to hinge on the fact that although
Forrest admits that he is “not a smart man,” he believes his mother when she insisted,
“You're no different than anybody else is.” In that sense, Forrest is as ignorant about his
own uniqueness as he is the larger social context in which he is living. He need not be
concerned with the potential obstacles faced by people with mental disabilities because
he manages to float easily through life like the metaphorical feather (an important aspect
of the film’s imagery). Forrest becomes accepted, even celebrated, by mainstream
society, but the messages that he embodies are potentially regressive ones. Forrest,
parroting his mother, espouses the belief that “You have to do the best with what God
gave you” and the ever-famous “Life is like a box of chocolates. You never know what
you’re gonna get.” This leaves the viewer to assume that when it comes to those who
society has deemed disabled, apparently the best you can do is throw yourself into
society, pretend you’re no different, and hope for the best, and maybe, like Forrest, you
will be rewarded with fame and fortune.
Examined together, these two films offer important insight into current issues
surrounding the education of students with disabilities. Since the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 specified that students with disabilities should be
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educated with their non-disabled peers “to the maximum extent appropriate,” public
school systems have slowly moved away from the traditional segregated model toward
integrating those students classroom versions of Edward’s Suburbia, complete with their
own disembodied repressiveness and long-standing norms. The passage of the 1990
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which Congressional amendments renamed the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in 1997, added to the urgency of
what widely became known as “inclusion.” According to the most recent statistics
released by the U.S Department of Education (2003), nearly half of all students with
disabilities (46.5 percent of more than 5 million students) are being educated in the
regular classroom for most of the school day (79 percent or greater).
The issues that have risen from this shift are highlighted in the characters of
Scissorhands and Gump. Like the Suburbanites, many educators are fearful of the bodily
entanglements that often accompany students with disabilities. They want to keep the
instructional and social norms they are comfortable with in place. Consider the
perspective on the inclusion of disabilities expressed in a New York Times Magazine
article:
On children’s television, the kid in the wheelchair has become a kind of mascot,
beloved by all his gang. But imagine a real-life classroom where all of the
children are nondisabled except the one who drools uncontrollably, who hears
voices or can’t read a simple sentence when everyone else can. Diversity is a
noble ideal. But many disabled children would be marginalized and ridiculed in
the mainstream . . .(Staples, 1999, quoted in Smith and Kozleski, 2005).
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The character of Edward Scissorhands seems to uphold this regressive outlook on
disability, the idea that some students are just better off in the Gothic mansions of
separate facilities and isolated resource rooms. We use the marginalization and ridicule of
students who are “different” as an excuse to keep them at a distance, which keeps us from
mussing up our tidy educational environments with something as vilified as human
saliva.
If Edward Scissorhands symbolizes what is “right” about isolation, then Forrest
Gump represents what is wrong with inclusion, not the concept itself, but our
misconceptions about what it means to be inclusive. Thanks in large part to the
persistence of his mother, Forrest participated fully in mainstream society, and he was
readily accepted once he left behind the vestiges of perceivable physical disability. Aside
from the sacrifices of his mother, no special accommodations were required of American
society in order for Forrest to drift through a blissfully ordinary life. Just as Forrest was
embraced by society, we as educators are somewhat more likely to accept students whose
disabilities do not force us to confront our own bodily inadequacies, students who can
otherwise be perceived as “normal.” In fact, despite his IQ of 75, Gump was heralded by
fans of the film as representative of the “ordinary” person. Perhaps more importantly,
Forrest’s experience would leave us to believe that if we simply allow students access to
the mainstream environment of the general education classroom and tell them, as
Forrest’s dear Mama told him, “You’re the same as everybody else. You are no
different,” then the students, not realizing that they are different, will be successful and
everyone will be happy. Unfortunately, it seems that this perspective has characterized
“inclusion” in many cases; the constitution of general education classes have changed
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with the addition of students with disabilities but the instructional and interpersonal
norms have remained the same (Baglieri and Knopf, 2004). We may have removed the
logistical barriers that prevented students with disabilities from accessing the curriculum,
but the socially constructed assumptions about disability, reflected in our popular media,
have remained intact.
These memorable film characters, along with the larger cinematic context from
which they emerged provide us with some understanding of how such popular culture
texts have written the disabled body out of and into educational practice. Norden (1994)
notes that “As powerful cultural tools, the movies have played a major role in
perpetuating mainstream society’s regard for people with disabilities, and more than not
the images borne in those movies have differed sharply from the realities of the
physically disabled experience. (p. 1). As Holmes (2003) notes, these narratives teach us
that it’s okay to feel horrified, relieved or inspired, whether we encounter disability in
films or in our everyday lives. As Holmes (2003) observes, the “objection here is not
with any of these feelings, per se, but with the fact that there are so few others suggested
by the textual and visual narratives that train us how to picture, talk about, and enact the
relationships to our own and others’ bodies shaped by the able-disabled binary” (Holmes,
2003, p. ix). In the case of the films discussed here, the representations of disability have
become a part of the broader cultural system; these films provide a safe space in which
we can explore our bodily fears from a safe distance. As Ryan and Kellner (1988) note,
they play an important role in shaping social reality, in this case, the able-disabled binary:
Films transcode the discourses (the forms, figures, and representations) of social
life into cinematic narrative. Rather than reflect a reality external to the film
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medium, films execute a transfer from one discursive field to another. As a result,
films themselves become a part of that broader cultural system of representations
that construct social reality. That construction occurs in part through the
internalization of representations (pp. 12-13).
Thus, the process through which we construct the “otherness” of disability occurs
through simultaneous acts of construction and internalization.
Films featuring people with disabilities have not only shaped social reality, but
the economy of the film industry as well. In contrast to the Oscar buzz that has been
generated over numerous portrayals of disability (most recently Million Dollar Baby
(2004), Ray (2004), The Hours (2002), A Beautiful Mind (2001), I am Sam (2001)),
primetime television hasn’t exerted a great deal of effort to feature actors or characters
with disabilities. As Davis (1994) notes, “although considerable effort has been expended
on the part of activists, legislators, and scholars, disability is still a largely ignored and
marginalized area. Every week, films and television programs are made containing the
most egregious stereotypes of people with disabilities, and hardly anyone notices”
(Davis, p. 159). In fact, with a little online research, one can find a lengthy list of
television shows that have addressed disabilities in some way, and discover that few
characters are in leading roles, and many of them are single, impoverished, oppressed, or
worse, fodder for comedy skits. For the most part television has not successfully created
many memorable characters that can be seen as ordinary people with human needs.
Life Goes On
This brings us back to Corky. Looking back on the history of film and television
portrayals of disability, Life Goes On seems to stand out as a marginally successful
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attempt to disable “otherness” through a lead role. Although the series, with its upbeat
theme song and saccharine tone, was not entirely practical when it came to the realities of
mainstreaming in America, it did portray some of the social challenges Corky faced in his
interactions as a student, and later, a husband. Yet, the title of the series Life Goes On
suggests a theme much like Forrest Gump: You do the best with what God gave you.
Life goes on in spite of being different. And in Corky’s case, life largely went on without
him as the show shifted the primary focus to the titillating storyline involving the
characters portrayed by Kelly Martin and Chad Lowe. This is what we say when we have
to face tragedy: life goes on, because it has to, because there are some things that are
beyond our control.
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, a prolific writer in disability studies, says, “We
want to redefine, to re-imagine, disability – not make it go away. But also not have it
remain with its stigmatic force. So we want it to go away in a way that we want it to go
away.” (Rosemarie Garland-Thomson in Brueggemann et. Al, 2005, p. 13). Similarly, I
want to redefine, re-imagine this Life Goes On portrayal of disability. For as long as we
maintain the “in spite of,” the able-disable binary persists. To say that life goes on in
spite of being different implies that it is a tragedy to be overcome, like the death of a
loved one. Sometimes being different is tragic, but it is not inherent to the body of the
person who falls short of what society calls “normal;” it is in the specular gaze, the
socially constructed perceptions that have been reified overtime. To say that life goes on
is to say that our lives are beyond our control, and certainly there are things that a single
body cannot change, but we need to recognize the power we have to construct disability.
We have to recognize that “disability” actually has more to do with the way we have
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constructed “our” society based on what works for the able. Chris Burke, like his
character, was imbued with self-confidence, bolstered by supportive parents and
professional success, which carried him through the complexities of mainstream life,
while Forrest Gump was satisfied simply believing he was “no different and being
unaware of the oppression that formed the context of his experiences (the Civil Rights
Movement, Vietnam), but expecting people with disabilities simply to believe in
themselves requires no effort on our part. As with the example of inclusion, we cannot
simply open the door and expect equality to magically materialize. We have to change
the way we think: about difference, about disabilities, about bodies.
Before we can expect to see genuine change in the way that we approach the
education of those whose minds and bodies do not conform to standards of normalcy, we
have to begin thinking differently about disability; we must question the hegemony of the
normal and begin to see ourselves as being “differently abled.” In all our rhetoric about
equality, about tolerance and acceptance, we might think that to do so would not require a
conceptual leap. But Davis (1994) tells us otherwise: we have only begun to rethink the
disabled body; in cultural studies we have romanticized transgressive bodies, but disabled
bodies have not yet begun to participate in "the erotics of power, in the power of the
erotic, in economies of transgression . . . There has been no rhetoric tied to prostheses,
wheelchairs, colostomy bags, cane or leg braces” (p.158).
Engaging Cultural Bodies
Thus, when it comes to interpreting and engaging in popular culture, we need to
bring disability more fully into our critical pedagogies. We have a responsibility as
members and educators of a vast audience to interrogate representations of disability and

90

seek out the ways they operate to shape our social and educational realities. As Stump
(2002) poignantly notes,
There is far too much fear, hatred, and misery in this world, much of which is
brought about by a lack of understanding and sympathy for people or groups of
people who are different from ourselves. It is important that we, as the motion
picture audience, become literate filmgoers, able to recognize even the subtlest
projection of discrimination or prejudice in the films we watch and react to
accordingly (p. 2002).
It is easy to allow films or television shows to wash over us and validate our own sense of
normalcy, but interrogating our own readings, seeking multiple readings in order to
deconstruct normalcy is a challenge. As Daspit and Weaver (2000) explain, “It means we
purposely seek out those voices that do not fit our world view or our readings of popular
culture texts (xix). Davis (1994) asserts that we can bring these multiple readings into the
classroom by
highlighting narratives, lyrics, and representations of disability in literature
courses, teaching the politics of disability in courses that deal with social and
political issues, making conscious efforts to include people with disabilities in the
media, and so on. Important as well would be the attempt to teach disability
across the curriculum so that this subject does not remain ghettoized in special
courses. This aspect of inclusion involves a reshaping of symbolic cultural
productions and ideology (p. 159).
If we imagine a reconceptualization of disability, it must involve this reshaping of the
symbolic ideology represented by popular culture. The initiation of these multiple
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readings should not occur because we feel sorry for people who are challenged by our
models of mental and/or physical normalcy, but because whether or not we like to admit
it, “ability” is situational, transient, and artificial. Instead of hypostatizing normalcy
through traditional interpretations of disability, we need to resituate our readings in terms
of the continuum of human ability.
Although I am now “able” in terms of the barriers I face in my life, constructions
of normalcy have profoundly shaped my thoughts, my actions, my body. I have to
assume that my immersion in the competing media of films, television, music,
magazines, literature, and the World Wide Web has something to do with my bodily
neuroses, so the desire to rewrite normalcy is personal for me. I have engaged, still
engage, in “body-centric thinking” that reflects a culture constructed by the able, for the
able, a paradigm that needs shifting. However, to overturn the hegemony of the normal,
to rethink the body, does not mean erasing difference. As Brenda Brueggmann (2005)
says, “I think somehow our social goal is not to erase disability, not even to normalize it,
but somehow to make it just one of the many aspects of who we are” (p. 15). This is
what Life Goes On represents for me. Life does not go on in spite of difference. Life is
difference.
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CHAPTER 4
THE BODY BITES BACK:
THE A.D.D. EPIDEMIC
Let me begin by telling you how this chapter was written. First of all, not one
word of was transferred from my brain, where it had been circulating intermittently for
two years, until two weeks before it had to be finished. Once the writing process began
for this and every chapter, this is basically how it happens: Turn music on, read, quote,
write, turn music off, click on high-speed internet browser, check email, reply to email,
read, quote, write conclusion I just thought of, turn music back on (different genre),
rearrange quotes, check a reference online, add a reference I forgot, read text message,
reply to text message, snack, read, think, take deep breaths to slow racing heart (stress),
quote, write, answer cell phone, reorganize articles, go home, fix coffee, fix snack for
children, change music, think, imagine screenplay to accompany music, cry, write
introduction I just thought of, music off, check online account balance, drag books and
laptop to bed, turn television on, check weather online, read, quote, write, turn television
off, turn music back on, rearrange more quotes, read, fall asleep. And as if the electronic
distractions aren’t enough to disrupt my hyper-stimulated writing sessions, I have to
constantly filter all the responsibilities of full-time work and motherhood that appear like
unwanted pop-ups waiting for a response (What about the laundry? When is that project
due for work? Wasn’t there something you were supposed to sign and send back to
school? When does your morning duty start?). Perhaps, then, one can see that my
interest in attention deficit, like the other issues of the body I am exploring here, is
personal.
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As an adult, I can relate to many of the characteristics physicians use to diagnose
what is often referred to as ADD; I am highly visual, a perfectionist, easily distracted, a
chronic procrastinator, easily frustrated by mundane tasks, and my brain seems to be
working overtime even in my sleep. So, I undertook this exploration of what is officially
known now as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) partly because I hope to
better understand my own apparent neuroses. More importantly, however, I want to
understand what the future might hold for those who may share the diagnosis of the
medicated children who entered my classroom each day, children whose deep confusion
about their bodies glistened in their questioning eyes. Children diagnosed with ADHD
are bodies in the margins of a standardized curriculum, and I believe that this condition
illustrates the complexities of transactional human bodies and some of the problems that
can arise from a disembodied curriculum.
First, what is ADHD and how has it come to be a fixture of American life?
ADHD has been described in many ways by various medical “experts,” but I want to
begin with Wired writer Evan Schwartz’s (1994) description best because it captures so
vividly my daily experience living as a distracted adult in an information-saturated
society:
Anxious to avoid boredom, those afflicted are constantly scanning their
environment, searching for all things captivating. They may read lots of books,
but they finish few. They misplace things and require constant reminders. They
are risk takers, thrill seekers, and, often, caffeine addicts. They are news junkies
and channel-clicker/cable-surfers. In conversation, they often detour into
parenthetical tangents, never returning to the main point. On the Net, they can't
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help getting lost in cyberspace for hours . . . They juggle too many projects and
are chronically late. But when something grabs their full attention, they can
launch into hyperfocus marathons that last well into the night (“Interrupt-Driven,
June 1994).
Indeed, Schwartz might be describing almost any postmodern American who operates
from within the complex network of hyper-connectivity. Indeed, this “interrupt-driven”
state, as Schwartz calls it, has emerged as a uniquely (although not exclusively)
American phenomenon. ADHD expert Edward Hallowell, author of a bestseller called
Driven to Distraction, actually heralds the condition as “a riveting new metaphor for our
cultural milieu” (1997), while Schwartz (1994) himself has dubbed it both the “Yuppie
Flu of the 90’s and the “official brain syndrome of the information age.”
While some adults have sought medical treatment for this condition as awareness
of ADHD in children has increased, it seems that most “wired” adults accept this constant
state of distraction as little more than a sign of the times. The numbers of adults
diagnosed with ADHD still remains fairly small as compared to the ever-increasing
population of school-aged children who have been labeled with the condition. Perhaps it
easy for adults, many of whom have grown accustomed to the daily distractions of multitasking, to entertain these glib indications of the prevalence of ADHD, but the realities of
our children are not as laughable. Each day, millions of students who were once resistant
to our attempts at colonizing them now begin their morning with a pill so that they can
languish in compliance. Over time, these children come to understand that there is
something wrong with them, that “normalcy,” however it may be constructed, must be
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maintained at all costs. What are these bodies, the bodies we are teaching each day, trying
to teach us?
The Pathology of ADHD
What the medical community has taught us is that ADHD is a mental disorder, a
deficiency, an abnormal state that can be a great inconvenience in a traditional classroom
setting. The “official” definition of ADD/ADHD in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) describes the symptoms of the
conditions in as they are expressed through patterns in lack of motor control, impulsivity,
and difficulties in organizing and focusing. Although the figures vary somewhat
depending on the source, it is clear that the condition is neither isolated nor uncommon.
Currently, the U.S. Department of Education (2005) estimates that between 3 and 5
percent of children have ADHD, which accounts for about 2 million children in the
United States. The estimates from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2006),
which accounts for all children ages 4 to 17, is higher: 8 percent or about 4.4 million.
Whatever the exact number may be these disquieting figures make it clear that
“epidemic” is an apt description of what has been deemed a “neurobiological disorder.”
When and where and how ADHD “began” has been debated among various
groups. In an effort to “legitimize” the condition by writing it into medical history, many
articles and web sites advocating for those diagnosed with the condition have pointed to
the poetry of Dr. Heinrich Hoffman, a physician who wrote books on medicine and
psychiatry, and began writing children’s poetry for his own young son. Hoffman
compiled a series of poems he wrote about children and their characteristics into a
collection that featured "The Story of Fidgety Philip," who can’t sit still in his chair at
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dinner and eventually turns the chair over, taking the tablecloth and everything on top of
it with him. Although this short depiction describes only one of the characteristics said
to define the condition – hyperactivity – ADHD advocates have heralded the story as an
“accurate” depiction of a child with the disorder.
Advocates also point to a series of lectures to the Royal College of Physicians in
England, published by Sir George F. Still (1902), in which he described a group of
children with behavioral problems that he attributed to a genetic dysfunction, as proof
that the condition existed largely unrecognized before its sudden explosion in the late
1980s and early 1990s. Another precedent was set when the term “organic drivenness”
was coined in the 1930s and physician Charles Bradley prescribed Benzadrine to control
hyperactivity (Diller, 1998, Armstrong, 1995). In the 1950s, the term “minimal brain
dysfunction” was used to describe a variety of symptoms related to brain injury, which
included “excessive restlessness” (Armstrong, 1995). However, it wasn’t until 1980 that
the American Psychiatric Association recognized the disorder, which, according to
Armstrong (1995), has gone through 25 name changes in the past century. It first began
to permeate the public consciousness after the publication of Barbara Ingersoll’s Your
Hyperactive Child, in which she suggested a drug regimen as a suitable treatment for
hyperactivity. In 1993, Peter Kramer, in Listening to Prozac, coined the term “cosmetic
pharmacology,” which signaled the marked shift toward treating non-debilitating
“neurobiological” disorders with psychotropic medications. Then, in 1994, Edward M.
Hallowell and John J. Ratey unveiled Driven to Distraction: Recognizing and Coping
with Attention Deficit Disorder from Childhood to Adulthood, which opened with the
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words, “Once you catch on to what this syndrome is all about, you’ll see it everywhere.”
(p. 3)
Hallowell’s almost giddy depiction of ADD and his willing endorsement of
Ritalin sparked a debate about the over-diagnosis and treatment of a largely
unsubstantiated condition. Multiple-intelligence scholar Thomas Armstrong (1995)
added his contribution with The Myth of the ADD Child, in which he questioned scientific
claims and what he called the “pathologizing” of normal children. Others followed:
Physician Lawrence H. Diller (1998) with Running on Ritalin and Richard DeGrandpre’s
(1999) Ritalin Nation: Rapid-Fire Culture and the Transformation of Human
Consciousness. In the wake of these publications, Washington writer Mary Eberstadt
bluntly asked in Policy Review the question that was lingering in the minds of many:
How has it come to pass that in fin-de-siecle America, where every child from
preschool onward can recite the “anti-drug” catechism by heart, millions of
middle-and upper-middle class children are being legally drugged with a
substance so similar to cocaine that, as one journalist accurately summarized the
science, “it takes a chemist to tell the difference”? (p. 24).
In 1991, the U.S. Department of Education qualified children diagnosed with ADD as
eligible for special education services, and as awareness of the condition increased, the
debate over using stimulants like Ritalin to treat Attention Deficit Disorder garnered
considerable attention. Just when the advocacy group Children and Adults with Attention
Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder (CHADD) had petitioned the DEA to make the drug
more readily available by changing its classification as a Schedule II drug, it was
revealed on television that the group had received $900,000 in undisclosed funds from
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the Ritalin giant Ciby-Geigy (now Novartis). Although the DEA denied the request, the
production of Ritalin continued to soar, increasing by 400 percent from 1990 to 1995
alone, resulting in an abundance of the drug, 90 percent of which is consumed in the
United States (Eberhardt 1999). With the increased availability of psychotropic
medication came a new era of accommodations: the 1990s also saw the emergence of
ADD-based requests for extra time on college and graduate level standardized tests,
including the SAT, LSAT, and the MCAT (Diller 1998). In 1999, the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission (EEOC) also issued guidelines for accommodating employees
diagnosed with the condition.
In spite of the rapid mobilization of the medical community to treat the condition,
no consensus could be reached about how to diagnose it. While many physicians,
including Hallowell (1994) have observed that like many conditions, ADHD tends to run
in families, diagnosis of the condition continues to be highly subjective, based on
behaviors documented by teachers such as fidgeting, distractedness, impatience, blurting,
disorganization, not listening, etc. In 1998, the National Institutes of Health organized a
conference with hundreds of participants and a panel of doctors and educators, but no
agreement could be made on how to diagnose the disorder (Eberstadt, 1999). Although
much research has been conducted in an effort to find a genetic predisposition for the
condition or link the diagnosis of ADHD to some significant difference in brain function,
numerous studies have yet to produce any substantive evidence. The most commonly
cited evidence for ADHD as a physiological condition is a 1990 study, conducted by
Alan Zametkin at National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), which appeared in New
England Journal of Medicine. Zametkin found a difference in the rates of glucose
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metabolism, but as Diller (1998) observes, a series of later studies failed to confirm the
original findings. DeGrandpre (1999) also points out other methodological problems:
the participants were adults (rather than children, who constitute the majority of those
with ADHD), there was connection made between the metabolism difference and the
outward behaviors of the subjects, and the study did not take into account other factors
that could have influenced metabolism differences, such as the smaller number of males
in the control group. Nevertheless, as Diller (1998) notes, the belief that ADD is a
neurological condition prevails not only among advocacy groups like CHADD but
medical researchers and university faculty as well.
Constructing Normalcy
ADHD provides an important example of the way that education is operating to
define “normalcy” in terms of how the body responds to the curriculum and the methods
used to impart it. This pathological stratification goes beyond Apple’s (1995) assertion
that schools “maintain privilege in cultural ways by taking the form and content of the
culture and knowledge of powerful groups and defining it as legitimate knowledge to be
preserved and passed on . . .They teach norms, values, dispositions, and culture that
contribute to the ideological hegemony of dominant groups (p. 38). With the adoption of
state-mandated curricula across the nation in the wake of No Child Left Behind, the
progressive question of whose knowledge is of most worth is nearly moot, but the
aggressive labeling that is taking place in schools today is not simply operating to
privilege the “standards” as legitimate knowledge; it is constructing norms and values
about the way we learn and about how our embodied knowledge fits (or does not fit) into
the curriculum. Although I expand on Apple’s (1995) understanding of the role of
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schools in reproducing “legitimate” knowledge, his explanation of deviance still fits:
“One might say here that deviance is “earned” by the deviant, since the overt and hidden
curriculum, the social relations of the classroom, and the categories by which educators
organize, evaluate, and give meaning to the activities found in schools are perceived as
being basically neutral” (p. 37). The active, spontaneous, and assertive ADHD body is
differentiated from the passive, predictable, and receptive “neutral” body through a state
of continual diagnosis.
Julie Webber’s (2003) description of the way that government has responded to
the deviant behavior of school violence is also indicative of the “official” response
ADHD: “The question always asked when such tragedies occur is ‘What are the
government, schools and lawmakers going to do about this problem?’ never ‘Why is this
happening now, to whom, and in what setting?’” (p. 193). In order to determine what to
do about the problem of millions of disengaged students and how to fix their
abnormalities, we look to individual bodies, which are much easily treated than a
curriculum in which we are so deeply invested. This state of perpetual diagnosis is
symptomatic of what Deleuze (1992) terms “control” societies, which differ from the
Foucauldian disciplinary societies in which individuals are passed through a succession
of institutions. In the disciplinary society, what is important is the individuals “place”
within the institutional framework, but in the control society the “password,” the means
of accessing the individual’s “information,” becomes the focus. In this case, it is through
the carefully documented (textualized) diagnosis that we gain access to information about
how the student deviates from the “neutral” standard of normalcy.
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A “biological” explanation for ADHD is convenient in many ways; parents can
rid themselves of the guilt that perhaps they caused their child’s condition, and biological
conditions can be treated inexpensively with medication. Many physicians and ADHD
advocates continue to hope that a definitive physiological and/or genetic “explanation”
for ADHD will be discovered in order to legitimize its status as a neurobiological
disability and justify the medical interventions that have become commonplace. As we
increase our “knowledge” of this condition, we perceive that we are gaining more
information about the children with these characteristics by identifying their deficiencies,
but instead we are isolating and exposing the minutia of their brains and genetic makeup
because we need this explanation in order to “prove” that there is really a tangible and
significant difference between people who exhibit the characteristics of ADHD and
“normal” people. This search for a genetic explanation is not unlike the way we have
attempted to define other forms of “deviance” in terms of eugenics:
Eugenics saw the possible improvement of the race as being accomplished by
diminishing problematic peoples and their problematic behaviors – these peoples
were clearly delineated under the rubric of feeble-mindedness and degeneration as
women, people of color, homosexuals, the working classes, and so on. (Davis,
2002, p 14.)
Just as our modern predecessors attempted to document what they saw as transgressive
characteristics in order to “treat” them, medical research has sought to put to text a grand
narrative to explain why so many children are now languishing in traditional classrooms
across the nation. These untamed, resistant bodies do not fit into the controlled and
scripted environment that becomes necessary for the transmission of a standardized
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curriculum. Thus, even in the absence of significant physiological makeup of those
diagnosed with ADHD, “experts” have depicted ADHD behavior as deviant and even
delinquent. Dr. David W. Goodman, an ADHD specialist at the John’s Hopkins
University School of Medicine in Baltimore, asserts that “those with untreated ADHD
take even more risks” warns, “A big problem is that someone with undiagnosed ADHD
may prompt other kids to do something really dangerous” (Bernstein, 2006, p. 17). Such
fear-enciting tactics have been successful in mobilizing concerned parents to accept
psychotropic medication as the primary treatment for their child’s academic failure. As
one child psychiatrist notes “Parents and teachers are rushing like lemmings to identify a
pathology. . . .Our current pathologizing of behavior leads to massive swelling of the
ranks of the diseased, the dysfunctional, the disordered and the disabled” (Moreno, 1998,
p. 1).
Indeed, this seems to be the case, as with the emergence of ADHD has also come
a dramatic new emphasis on subjectively diagnosed neurobiological disorders such as
specific learning disabilities and autism. Perhaps the most recognizable new condition is
that of Asperger’s sydrome, which is considered to be a “high-functioning” form of
Autism Spectrum disorder, which encompasses a wide range of largely unexplainable
mental conditions. The figures here are dramatic; according to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, the nation saw a 556 percent increase in the number of children
with ASD being served in special education from 1991 to 1997. The CDC now estimates
the incidence of Autism Spectrum disorders to be as high as 500, 000, affecting 0.024 to
0.36 % of school-age children (2006).
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Asperger’s didn’t officially join ADHD on the neurobiological scene until 1994,
when it was recognized by the American Psychiatric Association as a form of autism,
with distinct diagnostic criteria. In 1981, however, British psychiatrist Dr. Lorna Wing
published a paper that focused on the work of Hans Asperger, who had coined the term
“Little Professor Syndrome” in 1944 to describe the behavior of some of his patients
(Silberman, 2001). Asperger had noticed that these young patients often possessed
advanced verbal skills, tended to be extremely gifted in specific areas (especially math,
science, and art) but lacked certain skills of social interactions. In addition, children with
Asperger’s syndrome, according to the DSM-IV, have excellent rote memory, and
display intense curiosity about a specific area of interest (to the exclusion of other
interests), but they have difficulty empathizing with others, and often react
inappropriately in social situations. Children with Asperger’s often have limited facial
expressions and tone of voice, an inability to pick up on the non-verbal communications
of others, and an intense attachment to certain objects and routines. It was this
combination of characteristics, along with what seems to be a distinct genetic tendency
(which seems to be particularly pronounced among the techno-oriented families of
Silicon Valley), to dub the condition “The Geek Syndrome.”
As the veritable explosion of ADHD and Asperger’s illustrate, in recent years, the
pathological categories we use to “define” the “others” in our classrooms have expanded
rapidly to include many more characteristics and behaviors that are perceived to fall
outside the “norm.” Rhodes (1995) observes that, “ In the controversial ones, like
“behavioral disorders” and “learning disabilities,” we have isolated all sorts of subtle
differences, to the point where we could include most of the school population” (p. 460).
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Thus, the state of perpetual diagnosis puts everyone “at-risk” for falling outside the norm
and into a neurobiological disability. However, when it comes to certain conditions, it
seems that certain students are at greater risk than others: “a major portion of the
individuals and groups we consider to have pathologies in learning also come from
populations and cultures we have “othered” on the basis of color and socioeconomic
status” (Rhodes, 1995, p. 460). Thus, we see how the state of perpetual diagnosis,
framed as a means of “assisting” learners with “special needs,” operates to construct
cognitive privilege.
As with ADHD, we have responded to Asperger’s with the same questions of
what to do about the problem and the condition has been the subject of many concerns
about the potential delinquency of those diagnosed. Like those diagnosed with ADHD,
children with Asperger’s tend to be highly creative and inventive, and some skeptical
depictions of Asperger’s have even bordered on anti-intellectual criticism. Recently, in
an article called “Nutty Professors,” which appeared in Chronicle of Higher Education,
Mikita Brottman (2005) observed that, “Academe appeals particularly to introspective,
narcissistic, obsessive characters who occasionally suffer from mood disorders or other
psychological problems. Often, these difficulties go untreated because they are closely
tied to enhanced creativity (Brottman, 2005, p. B7.) Here, Brottman not only asserts that
we academics are just a bunch of nutcases; she further stigmatizes the energetic,
assertive, spontaneous, and sometimes socially awkward traits shared by those diagnosed
with both ADHD and Asperger’s.
In the schools’ response to both neurobiological abnormalities, we see the process
of textualization at work. Just as Foucault (1978) explained the regulation of sex in

105

disciplinary society through studying and committing all its aspects to writing so that it
could be properly controlled, we can see textualization operating to control the body. The
sudden emergence of these new neurobiological phenomena have prompted us to study
the brain extensively so that ostensibly all its aspects can be exposed and written into
medical “knowledge” (Block’s “incarceration of visibility). And yet, the mapping of the
brain has not rendered the answers we were looking for. Ironically, Hallowell (1997)
admits, that process has actually only left us with even more questions:
Today we know more than ever about the brain – but in learning more we have
realized how little we actually know. With sophisticated brain scans that map the
activity of networks of neurons we can peer inside the once impenetrable armor of
our skulls and learn just how brains act when they are seeking, thinking,
remembering, and even malfunctioning. And yet the vast territory of the brain
stretches out before us as uncharted, like the sixteenth-century maps of the New
World we used to see in our fifth-grade history books.” (p. 42).
Similarly, our attempts to “map” and textualize our genes in an attempt to uncover the
“essential” (read “neutral”) genome has only further complicated our understanding of
the complex interactions between human genes and the environment. As Davis (2002)
observes, we have discovered that “No one gene determines the course of a human life”
(p. 17). Brain science and genetic research has only further advanced a post-binary
understanding of nature/culture.
ADHD in Context
If our bodies are inseparable from the cultural contexts we find ourselves in, we
must consider the potential implications of the postmodern environment many Americans
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find ourselves in. We live in a world of technological distractions: cell phones, fax
machines, pagers, satellite channels, instant messages, high-speed web browsing, endless
emails. Not to mention, we have fast cars, fast food, fast-pass credit cards, and fast
vacations-to-go. As U.S. News & World Report informs us, “Since 1965, the average
news sound bite has shrunk from 42 seconds to just 8. The average network TV ad has
shrunk from 53 seconds to 25. Fifteen-second ads are on the rise. Multitasking is in.
Downtime is out” (3/26/01). Everywhere we go we are bombarded with more
information than we can possibly process, and our bodies, our brains, have to work
overtime to in an attempt to keep up. Restak (2003) explains that “the plasticity of our
brains responds, for good or for bad, to the technology all around us: television, movies,
cell phones, e-mail, laptop computers, and the Internet. And by responding, I mean that
our brain literally changes its organization and functioning to accommodate the
abundance of stimulation forced on it by the modern world” (p. 38).
This “modern” world, as Restak (2003) calls it, is the digital age, the mediasaturated, information overloaded postmodern America. In this predominantly visual
context, we experience life in pictures:
While driving to work in the morning we “fast-forward” a half-hour in our mind
to the upcoming office meeting. We reenact in our imagination a series of
“scenarios” that could potentially take place. A few minutes later, while entering
the garage, we experience a “flashback” of the awkward “scene” that took place
during last week’s meeting and “dub in” a more pleasing “take.” (Restak, 2003, p.
50).
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Here, the boundaries between where the images end and our bodies begin virtually
disappear; we transcend time and space to inhabit multiple locations so that “place” seem
insignficant. We are perpetually immersed in image. As I observed in describing
postmodern culture’s contribution to the disembodied curriculum, we are often left
feeling more distant from our material realities – flesh and blood lost in visual fiction –
but we fail to perceive that distance because the image becomes the separation.
An examination of the way the body operates within this digital-visual complex
allows us to explore those more pertinent questions offered by Webber (2003): Why are
these “neurobiological disorders” such as ADHD, happening now, to whom, and in what
setting? I think that Mark Hansen’s (2003) reinterpretation of Bergson's (1988) Matter
and Memory, emphasizes both the profound impact of visual culture and the role that our
bodies play in navigating the digital image. Hansen establishes the body as a kind of
central nexus: "the body functions as a kind of filter that selects, from among the universe
of images circulating around it and according to its own embodied capacities, precisely
those that are relevant to it" (3). Perception is always embodied, as with the dedifferentiated media of the digital era, we see changes in the "body's scope of perceptual
and affective possibilities" (22). Hansen explains these possibilities through the concept
of “affectivity”: “the capacity of the body to experience itself as “more than itself” and
thus to deploy its sensorimotor power to create the unpredictable, the experimental, the
new (p. 7). Here, Hansen is primarily countering the notion that technological innovation
leads to bodily transcendence and he makes an important statement about the
indispensability of the human in the digital era. However, Hansen’s description of how
the body and the image operate seamlessly to create perception also reveals the
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importance of understanding how our bodies are responding to our now profoundly
visual, hyper-stimulated, hyper-connected culture.
It is important to note here that I am not attempting to pinpoint “postmodern
visual media culture” as a culprit that has tainted the once obedient brains of our children.
To define a distinct cause and effect relationship would be to juxtapose techno-culture
and the body in binary terms. Rather, I want to explore this relationship to explore how
a non-dichotomous understanding of the body might lead us to reconsider our “response”
to variations in cognitive style and social interaction. I return to Sullivan’s (2001)
definition of the “transactional” body:
the relationship between organism and environment is dynamic and ongoing, both
organism and environment are continually being remade by means of shifts and
changes in the other. Thus “transaction” designates a process of mutual
constitution that entails mutual transformation, including the possibility of
significant change (p. 1).
If we begin to think of our bodies as engaged in a process of mutual reorganization with
our environments, we can begin to see rigid our ideas about teaching and learning have
remained in comparison.
Hansen’s (2003) emphasis on imagery is key to understanding the predominantly
visual context of a digital environment. If we take seriously Hansen’s notion of the body
as the transactional, medial nexus of perception that, like the digital image, is continually
being remade, reorganized, and revised, we can understand the importance of mutual
constitution. In the digital era, we can no longer imagine that technology exists as a
distinct entity independent of the body. Technology has provided us with the ability to
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exist in multiple identities and presences simultaneously. As Restak (2003) explains,
“The demarcation between here and elsewhere has become blurred. Thanks to
technology, each of us exists simultaneously in not just one here but in several” (p. 52).
We rely on image to navigate those multiple presences between where our flesh and
blood happens to be physically situated and the multiple “locations” we find ourselves in.
Restak (2003 expands on this thought, explaining that, “intellectually, we have always
known that the “reality” of the here and now before our eyes is only one among many.
But we never directly experienced this multilevel reality until technology made it
possible to reach from one end of the world to another and wipe out differences in time,
space, and place” (p. 53).
The particular characteristics used to define ADHD: the constant cognitive
“scene” shifting, the state of hyperawareness of the image, illustrate the way that this
process of mutual transformation has operated to change the way that many students are
responding to methods of schooling that no longer make sense for who they are. The
reliance of those diagnosed with ADHD on image-based perception has been
corroborated in scientific study: A 2000 study (Schweitzer et al., 2000) had adults with
and without ADHD listen to a series of numbers, add each number to the previous
number. Those with ADD said they visualized images rather than simply listening to the
spoken numbers, which was also confirmed using brain-imaging technology. In the
ADHD adults, the so-deemed visual processing regions of the brain were activated,
whereas the non-ADHD adults tended to rely on auditory processing to interpret the
information that was given to them. In the image-rich, media-drenched cultural
environment, we must attempt to adapt to the constant barrage of digital information
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through multiple, simultaneous acts of cognition – we receive information all at once and
often spontaneously from countless sources and we rely on our bodies (Hansen’s medial
nexus) to, returning to Hansen’s (2003) words, “deploy its sensorimotor power to create
the unpredictable, the experimental, the new” (p. 7). Considering the modern work
environment described by Restak (2003), one could easily argue that a person has to
possess at least some ADHD traits just to survive in the adult techno-culture:
You must learn to rapidly process information, function amidst a surrounding
your parents would have described as “chaotic,” always remain prepared to
rapidly shift from one activity to another, and redirect your attention among
competing tasks without becoming bogged down or losing time. Such facility in
rapid information processing requires profound alternations in our brain (p. 48).
Compare this corpo/reality of the digital context to the classroom setting where, even
when multiple modes of presentation are employed, children are generally offered one
information source to which they are to impart their undivided attention. This traditional
top-down method (Freire’s (197?) banking method still at work) is a one-to-all approach
in which information originating in the standards is passed down from one teacher (or
textbook) to all students. As Freed and Parsons (1997) observe, “Our educational system
hammers at visual learners’ weaknesses rather than utilizing their greatest strength: an
uncanny visual memory. The cost of such rigidity is incalculable, and the lost potential is
astronomical” (p. 18).

When teachers today complain that they can’t “compete” with

video games, they are expressing the frustration that comes from the presence of
technology that surpasses the limitations of human physicality. And yet, rather than
trying to really understand the process that is taking place here, what we do about this
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“problem,” is rigidly cling to the restrictive one-to-all approach and rely on medication to
regulate the unruly bodies. In the same way that our society turns difference (immobility,
for example) into disability by failing to make an environment navigable for someone
confined to a wheelchair, we make the cognitive and physical traits of ADHD a disability
by failing to make the curriculum navigable. However, because we assume that the
curriculum is “neutral,” we treat the child instead of the environment. Of course,
medication has not been the only way we have tried to control the symptoms of ADHD,
but alternative treatments for ADHD have offered little hope. Thousands of parents,
desperate to keep their children off medication being pushed on them by commercial
medicine, have tried modified diets, exercise plans, herbal remedies, and biofeedback
training, among other non-pharmacological treatments, but it seems that only
psychotropic drugs consistently force their bodies into the conformity that the
standardized curriculum requires.
Psychotropic Ethics
The issue here, where medication is concerned, is not that all psychotropic drugs
are evil or that altering the body to make it “fit” into an environment is always wrong.
We all want to be well, to be free from pain, free to live and move as we choose. But
there is nothing liberating about using stimulant drugs to preserve a culture of schooling
that is grounded in inequality and hegemony. Part of the incalculable cost of the rigidity
of our educational system is realized in the perpetuation of disembodied educational
practice and the preservation of an outdated notion of an ideal, “neutral” student body.
By “treating” the symptoms of conditions like ADHD and Asperger’s so that students can
conform to the demands of a maladaptive (morose) curriculum, we fail to recognize the
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what Jane Healy (2004) calls the “magic of human variability.” The human body is not
standard, static, consistent. As the opening Aldous Huxley quote illustrates, the only
consistent people are dead. However, our obsession with constantly diagnosing the
cognitive styles and classroom behaviors of our students suggests that we still believe in
some essential model, the “model” student body. If we are determining some students
are “deficient” because we find them to be active, energetic, hyperaware of sensory data,
and existing in states of multi-presence, then the ideal student must be one who is
passive, half-hearted, unaware of all of but the authoritative teacher, and existing only in
the here and now. Certainly, such a student body makes for a convenient vessel, but is
this a realistic ideal for the digital age? As Hartmann (1996) explains, “our system was
designed from the ground up to operate exactly as it does today. Once upon a time the
most important product of a public school system, for government and commerce, was
compliant young women for the household and men for the arm and industry. Do we still
want this today?” (p. 21).
Hartmann’s question is pivotal: do we still want this? Is this normative apparatus,
the standardized curriculum, designed to contain the excesses of the body, worth the price
that millions of American children are paying? As David Nylund (2000) observes, “To
place a child on Ritalin so that he can succeed in this environment ignores the wider
problem: the structure, tools, methods, and resources of our schools” (p. 186). Why must
we diagnose and treat the body without consideration for the context? What is the
advantage of the pathologizing of difference? Eberstadt (1999) has an answer:
One of the most obvious reasons “millions of Americans, most of them children,
are now taking Ritalin can be summarized in a single word that crops up
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everywhere in the dry-bones literature on add and its drug of choice: compliance.
One day at a time, the drug continues to make children do what their parents and
teachers either will not or cannot get them to do without it: Sit down, shut up,
keep still, pay attention” (p. 24).
Perhaps we are getting what we want, if what we want to keep the messy, frenzied
intricacies of bodies out of our classrooms – out of sight, out of mind. But what are we
really getting? As Breggin (1998), observes, “Ritalin calms children, indeed it often
turns rambunctious kids into socially inhibited conformers, which, though it may make
things easier for teachers and parents, is but suppressing the growing-up problems, not
solving them” (p. 99). It seems to me that just when we need more than ever to really
consider our corpo/realities, our embodied perceptions, we find ways to push needs and
desires further into the margins of curriculum. The medicated compliance of unruly
bodies comes at a high price:
If we think of our ourselves as little more than chemical machines that can be
altered by drugs, then what happens to traditional concepts like free will and
personal responsibility? While for the most part advances in our understanding of
the brain lead to enhancement of, rather than limitations on, our freedom, what
will be the overall result if the benefits come at the price of biobabble: people
interpreting their experience in chemical terms rather than interpersonal ones
(Restak, 2003, p. 147)?
Instead of considering moving out of our pedagogical comfort zones, instead of engaging
our students’ minds and bodies in confronting difference through dialogue and
experience, we allow medication to become yet another boundary, a safety net to protect
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us from the body in chaos. Not only do we teach children that difference is unacceptable,
and that the possess deficits beyond their control, but we diminish the possibility that we
can reclaim the distance we had already created between ourselves and the bodies we
teach, between teachers and children.
Each day, parents across the country are struggling with the decision to medicate
their children with powerful stimulants to standardize them, to diminish the intricate
variations that have emerged from the mutual transformation of the body/techno-culture
complex. I am writing for these parents, and I am writing for the children who grow up
believing that they lacking, deviant, sick. I am also writing for my own children, because
although my bright, imaginative daughter has thus far lived up to the “ideal,” I live in fear
that one of my sons might eventually become yet another casualty of perpetual diagnosis.
From the time my oldest son turned two, I have monitored his behavior with baited
breath, becoming more apprehensive with every year. Because he has a late birthday,
ADHD played a big part in our decision not to send him to state-funded Pre-K until he
was almost five. Now almost six, he is a conscientious student but he is an active child
and a visual learner like me. As he gets ready to enter kindergarten next year, I worry,
what if he is too restless? What if he doesn’t listen? What will I do if I have to face the
guilt and shame that millions of American parents have confronted in the last decade?
For now, I can only hope that his body will be able to navigate between the structured,
standardized classroom and the fast-paced, stimulating and spontaneous world he knows.
The question that remains for all of us is how many millions of cognitively
“disabled” children will it take for us to understand that the deficit lies not in our
constantly shifting corpo/realities but in the educational system that has failed to respond
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to our changing technological and cultural landscapes? Eberhardt’s (1999) sarcasm
illustrates the absurdity of the dilemma we find ourselves in: “Surely this country can do
more, much more, to reduce fidgeting, squirming, talking excessively, interrupting, losing
things, ignoring adults, and all those other pathologies of what used to be called
childhood (p. 24). Where do we draw the line? How many millions of children must we
medicate before we decide that maybe the “easy” solution wasn’t really a solution at all?
Certainly, the current obsession with high-stakes standardized testing has only
exacerbated the disembodiment of school curriculum and educational practice. Maybe
standardized testing is never going to go away. Perhaps, then, our responsibility is even
more urgent because we have to find a way to address the needs of transactional bodies in
meaningful ways in spite of assessments that force us to maintain a safe distance. We
cannot allow the living, breathing, social, emotional, chaotic, complex, unique, and
wonderful bodies of our children to be overshadowed by accountability. If we have any
hope of preserving democratic public education in this country, we have to find a way to
embrace the “magic of human variability,” spontaneity, difference. Our bodies give us a
place to start.
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CHAPTER 5
BODIES IN THE CLASSROOM:
REFLEXIVE PEDAGOGY AND AN EMBODIED CURRICULUM
What does the future hold for our teaching bodies and the taught bodies of
children who enter our classrooms each day? Can we allow difference, bliss, and pain to
inform our pedagogies? Can we liberate capricious, extraordinary bodies, isolated and
othered through theory, pedagogy, popular culture, and pathology, from the margins of a
standardized curriculum?
In the era of high-stakes testing and accountability, these questions seem more
important now more than ever. In keeping with a long history of behaviorism and the
idea that the “most anxiety produces the best results,” we have placed an enormous
amount of pressure on teachers to shape their students into the standardized ideal – or
else. In light of such extreme pressures, as Kohn (2005) observes, we see that “[p]ractice
tests replace student-centered projects; students appear alternately anxious and bored;
terrific teachers quit in disgust (p. 20). What’s more, teachers, many of whom understand
the inability of standardized tests to accurately “measure” their students, resort to
medication to deal with the anxiety of accountability, and students are placed on
medication to control characteristics that are not conducive to shallow, desubstantialized
learning. And perhaps, worst of all, students and teachers come to understand that their
only value lies in the text, the scores they produce, and that their bodies, their physical,
social, emotional experiences are not important. As Kohn (2005) explains, “when some
capabilities are privileged over others, and a broader approach to education is sacrificed,
we begin to look at students differently. We lose sight of children “except as they
distribute themselves across deciles (Hogan, 1974, p. 111)” (p. 20). To lose sight of
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children beyond the rhetoric of standards and accountability is to ignore their
corpo/realities, their embodied knowledge and experiences, the lenses of their perception.
Making Bodies Matter
In the regimented system of top-down scripts and standardized objectives, we
have constructed boundaries between “academic” learning and all the other types of
knowledge we need to experience the world within and beyond the classroom doors. As
Reynolds (2003) observes, “Our entire economic and educational system is based on
profit, efficiency and control rather than on human need, justice and compassion” (p. 42).
We have operated under a widespread belief “that schools are best organized to
accomplish academic goals and that we should charge other institutions with the task of
pursuing the physical, moral, social, emotional, spiritual, and aesthetic aims that we
associate with the whole child (Noddings, 2005, p. 10). We have pushed aside these
other aspects of our students’ being in an effort to perpetually textualize and diagnose
them so that we can fill their deficits before test time comes. This separation, this
alienating codification, does not resonate with our complexity of our most intimate
context, our bodies. If we want to make public education matter, if we want it to be
meaningful, and liberating, and worthwhile, we have to complicate our understanding of
what teaching and learning really mean. As Eisner (2005) observes,
In the human organism, there is no such thing as an independent part; all parts are
interconnected. We need to recognize those connections when we teach, when we
design education environments, when we provide incentives, and when we grade
students. Attention to such complex matters will not simplify our tasks as
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teachers, but it will bring education closer to the heart of what really matters” (p.
18).
We do need to recognize those connections, but we need to do more than that; we need to
broaden our understandings of achievement and assessment and bring the body, with all
its frenzied, impulsive intricacies, fully into the curricular conversation.
We can begin by rethinking the body in theory. We need to resist the temptation
to employ postmodernism in writing the physical body out of discursive subjectivity. We
can appreciate the fleeting quality of our culturally constructed identities without losing
sight of bodies that bleed and break. We have to recognize not only the way that we
discursively construct our bodies but how our bodies participate in language games
through initiation and response, sometimes without our permission. To do so requires
that we “get over” our biological insecurities, our fears of confronting the frailty of
human flesh. As LeCourt (2004) asserts, we have to recognize the role our bodies play in
our knowing of ourselves and others:
My body is how I perceive myself. I have lived in this body for years; it is this
body with whom others interact, and through this body that I construct the social
relations that sustain me in the material world. There is a substance to body, my
students continually remind me, that is not perceived as fluid or discursive.
Rather, we live within social relations with others that are perceived as bodily
interactions (p. 21).
Just as Hansen (2004) recognizes the body as the medial nexus for the image, LeCourt
sees the body as the site from which our social relations are constructed. Thus, we bring
the body into theory by considering how our understandings of identity, our perceptions
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of ourselves and others, are intimately and simultaneously connected to our bodies and
our social/cultural/technological relations.
Lennard Davis (2002) suggests that we can reimagine the body in theory by
expanding our thinking from postmodernism to what he calls “dismodernism,” a
rethinking of our understanding of postmodern identity through disability. Davis (2002)
suggests that disability is unique in that it is historically linked to the categories of
oppression most visible in academic discourse: race, gender and sexuality (p. 26). I have
already noted Davis implication the eugenics movement in “diminishing problematic
peoples and their problematic behaviors – these peoples were clearly delineated under the
rubric of feeble-mindedness and degeneration as women, people of color, homosexuals,
the working classes, and so on” (p. 14). These transgressive bodies were faultily but
powerfully constructed through pathological categories of disability. The “flawed”
science used to initially construct these identities is not unlike the questionable methods
used to define the newest postmodern additions to the category of disability,
“neurobiological” disorders like ADHD. Thus, by studying the ways that disability has
been constructed, we can explore “how all groups, based on physical traits or markings,
are selected for disablement by a larger system of regulation and signification” (Davis,
2002, p. 29). Davis argues that, considering the initial construction of race, gender, and
sexuality as well as the vast assortment of “conditions” (blindness, amputation, obesity,
disfigurement, diabetes, attention deficit disorder, Asperger’s, learning disability, and so
on) that are included under the category, disability presents us with a “malleable view of
the human body and identity” (26). Thus, Davis’ notion of “dismodernism” helps us
understand how power has operated to construct the inequality of particular bodies, and

120

the importance of the recognition that human bodies cannot and should not be
standardized:
The dismodern era ushers in the concept that difference is what all of us have in
common. That identity is not fixed but malleable. That technology is not
separate but part of the body. That dependence, not individual interdependence,
is the rule. There is no single clockmaker who made the uniform clock of the
human body. The watchword of dismodernism could be: Form follows
dysfunction.” (p. 27).
The notion of dismodernism helps to bring the body into discourse in a way that
recognizes the “magic of human variability,” the unity in difference, and the fiction of
“normalcy.” Davis’s expansion of the postmodern subject allows us to bring the body
into discourse in a meaningful way while maintaining our understanding of the physical
body as inseparable from its discursive social, cultural, and educational contexts.
Whether or not we can accept Davis’ abandonment of normalcy, we can imagine
a body that is at once subject and object, discursive and substantive. As Grumet (2005)
explains, “My body is not only material and the object of another’s gaze, it is also my
contact with the world, and through it runs a stream of responses and meanings that
escapes the channels that culture has constructed to contain it (Grumet, 2003, p. 250).
Grumet (2003) looks to Merleau-Ponty (1964) to clarify the third space of subjectivity
that is both “of the body” and “of the world.” Merleau-Ponty finds that his subjectivity
“is inseparable from this body and this world. The ontological world and body which we
find at the core of the subject are not the world or body as idea, but on the one hand the
world itself contracted into a comprehensive grasp, and on the other hand the body itself

121

as a knowing-body” (p. 408). Such an admission of the body as knowing-body and
discursive body allows us to deconstruct the body without denying its existence.
Recognizing the fiction of normalcy and the role our bodies play as the nexus of
our social/cultural/technological interactions can also help us resituate the body within
the curriculum. The bodies of teachers and students are knowing-bodies existing both in
the classroom and in the world. Acknowledging our bodies, resituating the body as the
nexus of perception, is both liberating and limiting, as Grumet (2003) explains:
My body throws a horizon around my imagination. It does not reduce my
subjectivity to my arthritic knee; it does not erase my mortality because my hair is
still brown. But it tethers my imagination to a set of possibilities, which, although
it is protean, is not limitless. This aesthetic reveals the reciprocity of subjectivity
and objectivity by recognizing that the object of study, whether it is literature,
sociology, field biology, or composition, is constituted by an inquiring
subjectivity: We see what we look for, and what we look for is constituted not
only by what my body can do, but also what it cannot do (p. 255).
These inquiring bodies are our nexus for knowing the world and interacting with others;
we cannot act on the teacher or the student without also acting on the body because the
body is always already inscribed in language, written into the curriculum in more or less
damaging ways. The disembodied curriculum, then, is one that fails to “see” the body,
one that writes the body into the margins in order to accomplish its educational goals.
Embodying Pedagogy and Curriculum
An embodied curriculum, then, is one that “sees” the body, one that brings the
body fully into the learning process to act as the vinculum drawn over
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social/cultural/technological interactions within and beyond the classroom. An embodied
curriculum draws us into intimacy with the sensual, unruly, unpredictable, desirous body;
it is a curriculum that recognizes the connections “between materiality and the psychic
world, between social and cultural conditions and circumstances, between desires and
pleasures, as well as disappointments,” and “undermines ‘orderly’ teacher-student
relations” (Levy, 2000, p. 83). I like the term “reflexive” because it has both
physiological and theoretical meanings: it refers both to an action performed without
conscious thought and the method or theory that takes account of presence of the
researcher/author on what is being investigated. Reflexive pedagogy, then, refers back to
the embodied subject and the larger contexts from which it is inseparable. Rather than
forcing the body to fit into the curriculum in discrete bits and pieces (30 minutes of
physical education here, a week of sex education there), the reflexive curriculum always
already recognizes the body, so that references to embodied knowing become an organic
part of the learning process. The reflexive curriculum, like the
culturally/socially/technologically embedded body, is connected, responsive, meaningful,
personal, multiplex.
Certainly, this approach to teaching and learning sounds inviting, but how do we
realize embodied, reflexive practice when we are mandated to deliver rigid, standardized
content and produce evidence of learning that is limited to answering multiple-choice
questions? As Eisner (2005) notes, “One consequence of our preoccupation with
standards is that it freezes our conception of what we want to accomplish in our schools.
Rigor gets defined and becomes associated with rigor mortis.” (p. 15). Is it too late to
revive public education and recover curriculum from the rigor morgue? Obviously, I
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would not be writing about reflexive pedagogy if I didn’t think it was a real possibility, in
spite of the constraints of state-dictated standards. As a person whose very livelihood
stems from school improvement (read increased test scores) efforts, I want to be realistic
about what I am proposing here. While it seems logical that a truly reflexive curriculum
would emerge from the needs and interests of the learners rather than the mandates of
official knowledge, I do not believe that prescriptive standards erase all possibility of
reflexivity and embodied learning. Rather, by changing the way we think about teaching
bodies, we can begin to recognize the connections, meanings, and multiplicities that even
the youngest knowing-bodies always already bring to the classroom. Our job as
educators is to accept and embrace those aspects in our students and our selves.
In honoring the variability of bodies and contexts, I would not venture to offer a
prescriptive framework for establishing a reflexive curriculum. We could imagine as
many different ways to embody, personalize, complicate, re-member and re-vise
curricula as there are classrooms. However, I want to discuss some of the reflexive
practices that can help inform embodied learning. These practices, which I have chosen
to discuss because they most resonate most with my understanding of embodied
pedagogy, are not conceptually distinct; they bleed into and from one another, and they
could be expressed in many different ways depending on the particular context in which
they emerge.
Disclosure
When I introduced my body autobiography in the first chapter, I brought up
Donna Lecourt’s (2004) observation that “theory does not begin in the academy; it begins
in everyday interactions and reactions. It begins in autobiography” (p. 1). To write
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reflexively about the body, I had to unearth and unbury my “private” understandings (or
perhaps, misunderstandings) about my body. I believe that this process of disclosure is
important to reflexive pedagogy because it is a way of purposefully bringing our bodies,
our inquiring subjectivities, into the classroom. As I began to examine the body through
the perceptual lens of disability, I came across a dialogue between three scholars with
disabilities who, each new term, anticipated the moment when they would “disclose”
their disabilities to their university students. I wondered, if we all walk into the
classrooms with different needs, desires, identities, and varying abilities and disabilities,
why don’t we feel the need to offer a similar “confession”? If we think of our bodies in
Davis’s (2003) “dismodern” terms, and we accept that “form follows dysfunction,” then
we can see how disclosure can undermine the isolating and alienating fiction of normalcy
and bring us into a more intimate relationship with ourselves and others.
However, because we are accustomed to relegating our corpo/realities to the
margins of educational environments, such disclosure does not come naturally.
Brueggemann and Moddelmog (2003), who term this “coming out pedagogy,” observe,
“This act of naming our invisible and supposedly private identities can seem to turn the
classroom away from knowledge and toward intimacy, and this can be troubling for both
our students and ourselves because we have been conditioned to see the classroom as
only an intellectual space” (p. 213). Yet, this process of “coming out,” of confessing our
particular embodied subjectivities, serves to deconstruct the boundaries we have created
to confine the body in the traditional school curriculum. The process becomes even more
meaningful when it becomes a continual process rather than a single moment: “Within
this perspective, our coming out is not so much a functional disclosure as it is an
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embodied performance” (Brueggemann and Moddelmog, 2003, p. 213). This embodied
performance allows teachers and students to resituate identity within an understanding of
both oppressive and enabling relationships. In this way, the ongoing dialogue of
disclosure becomes “a bidirectional process of communication in which we and our
students must do more than simply encounter a “secret”: We and they must relate to it.
That relationship is sometimes comforting, sometimes discomforting, and sometimes
both at once” (Brueggemann and Moddelmog, 2003, p. 213.).
Lability
The process of disclosure is perpetuated through another element of reflexive
practice: lability, an openness to change and spontaneity. I choose to use this term
because its meanings are rooted in the body: In biochemistry, labile means easily
repositioned, as, for example, a labile nitric oxide molecule. In a psychiatric context,
labile refers to emotional instability, freely expressed and easily aroused emotions and
uncontrolled moods. I take great pleasure in taking this term, often used by medical
professionals to describe the mood swings experienced by menstruating, pregnant, and
menopausal women, as presenting it is a positive trait of reflexive pedagogy. Freedom of
emotional expression, instability and spontaneity are all vital elements of our being open
to the new ways of teaching and learning that emerge from our deepened explorations of
our subjectivities. Once we have begun to participate in the process of disclosure, our
particular needs and desires can inform and shape the curriculum so that we avoid
privileging certain bodies and ways of knowing. However, the traditional structures of
that guide school improvement – schedules, grading and promotion policies, assessments,
and outwardly imposed expert “interventions” – are not often conducive to a responsive,
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collaborative curriculum and generally operate under paradigms of efficiency and
control. As Eisner (2005) asserts, “for U.S. schools, the speed of reaching the destination
is considered a virtue: The brighter students are the faster students” (p. 17). Education,
then, becomes not something to evoke pleasure and fulfillment (like a satisfying meal)
but another rebarbative chore that must be must be accomplished in order to move on to
more important things (like waste management). Consider the traditional model of
curriculum proposed by Bobbit (1918) nearly a century ago in The Curriculum: “These
will show the abilities, attitudes, habits, appreciations and forms of knowledge that men
need. These will be the objectives of the curriculum. They will be numerous, definite
and particularized. The curriculum will then be that series of experiences which children
and youth must have by way of obtaining those objectives” (42). This canonical view of
curriculum, from which Tyler’s (1949) authoritative Basic Principles of Curriculum and
Instruction emerged, could very well describe the state-mandated models now in use,
which leave little room for flexible, sensitive instruction that addresses the needs and
desires of particular bodies.
Moreover, school administrators, educators, and parents internalize these
paradigms, finding it hard to imagine “improvement” outside of these frameworks. In
this context, continual flexibility, changing to meet the needs of particular bodies in
particular situations, becomes problematic. The dilemma we must face is whether we can
be open to reflexive educational environments embodying “soft” values that, as Eisner
(2005) observes, “substantially differ from the dominant cultural view?” (p. 16). If we
have so concretized a narrow concept of academic performance as the “key to social and
economic mobility,” can we convince communities of learners to “risk” this established
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measure of achievement in order to “enliven school life” in ways that may be perceived
as “nonacademic” (Eisner, 2005, p. 16)?
Dialogue
In order to create spaces for disclosure and flexibility, and thus, risk, we have to
reevaluate our embedded perceptions of teaching and learning through critical dialogue.
If we accept the body as inscribed in language, then embodied pedagogy must involve
engaging in meaningful, personal discourse. As Reynolds (2003) suggests, “A
curriculum should allow both teacher and student to develop a critical, caring,
compassionate conversation rather than treat human beings as objects to be manipulated
by prescribed and pre-fashioned technical rationales that reduce human beings to mere
raw material” (p. 43). Peter Trifonas (2005) explains that discourse is important because
it is the “medium through which students can practice the critical power to interrogate
concepts for the sake of learning more about the self while keeping in mind the
exploitation or alienation that may arise when knowledge claims are taken to be absolute
and not interpretations to be enriched by the creative adding of the difference of
experience to a rational possibility” (p. 159). Dialogue creates passages from which to
negotiate the complexities of embodied subjectivity, and asks teachers and students to
reconsider knowledge claims through an understanding of difference. Dialogue, then,
gives way to critical pedagogy, which “allows, indeed encourages, students and teachers
together to confront the real problems of their existence and relationships... When
students confront the real problems of their existence they will soon also be faced with
their own oppression (Grundy, 1987, p. 105). Critical dialogue opens up the curriculum
to possibility, contradiction, and difference. Students can then begin to interrogate the
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ways that regulation and signification operate to “castigate difference in the everyday
conditions that house the living realm of our aspirations as students and teachers”
(Trifonas, 2005, p. 159).
Like disclosure, dialogue does not necessarily emerge easily when both teachers
and students are accustomed to a passive, top-down, standardized curriculum. Engaging
in critical dialogue calls our identities and beliefs into question, which Delpit (1988) says
“is not easy. It is painful as well, because it means turning yourself inside out, giving up
your sense of who your are, and being willing to see yourself in the unflattering light of
another’s angry gaze. It is not easy, but it is the only way to learn what it might feel like
to be someone else and the only way to start the dialogue” (p. 297). By starting the
dialogue, we engage our bodies in the learning process and the active, collaborative
transformation of our inquiring subjectivities.
Co-operation
By continually disclosing and building connections through our discursive
“secrets,” and engaging in critical dialogue, teachers and students can work together,
operating jointly to construct a classroom curriculum that is meaningful and personal –
embodied. Kohn (2005) calls this collaborative model a working with approach rather
than a doing to strategy. Rather than imposing the mandated curriculum on students
through a set of prescribed practices laid out neatly by a textbook, the standards become a
part of our disclosure as teachers: we expose them to the students and engage them in
constructing learning experiences that can reach the needs and desires they have
disclosed to us. All of the constraints and mandates that are imposed on us –
performance standards, pacing guides, textbooks, assessments – as well as our own needs
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and desires as experienced educators, are brought into the dialogue so that these limits
can become part of the critical conversation. In the same way that we name our
subjective identities through disclosure, we name the mandates, exposing them and
making them transparent so that they become a part of the ongoing dialogue about how
and why and what we learn. Like the co-evolving body/culture/technology complex, we
work through our rhizomatic connections to “co-operate” in constructing the curriculum,
enacting new social relations and laying bare the power relations that create inequality
along the way. Through consistent and ongoing dialogue, the curriculum (even a
standardized one) can be revisited, reimagined, and reconstructed to meet the meet the
needs of our knowing-bodies.
Discomfort
The process of continual disclosure and dialogue opens up the curriculum to a
level of intimacy and interdependence that can be disconcerting, which leads us to the
reflexive condition of discomfort. Embodied pedagogy requires us to constantly move
out of our comfort zones to unearth the private and the passionate, which have long been
silenced by the traditional school curriculum. Yet, it is through such discomfort that we
can confront the contradictions of our corpo/realities, interrogate normalcy and disability,
and accept and embrace difference in order to construct a reflexive curriculum. This
discomfiting dialogue is a transformative space from which we can explore our own
subjectivities and call into question the dominant values that typically frame teaching and
learning, which Boler and Zembylas (2003) describe as “pedagogy of discomfort.”
Through this process, students and teachers work together to recognize and problematize
“the deeply embedded emotional dimensions that frame and shape daily habits, routines,
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and unconscious complicity with hegemony (Boler and Zembylas, 111). Pedagogy of
discomfort purposefully attends to affective perception and embodied knowing in order
to expose the ways we perform and hypostatize prevailing norms and assumptions
traditional educational habits and routines. As Boler and Zembylas (2003), explain, “By
closely examining emotional reactions and responses – what we call emotional stances –
one begins to identify unconscious privileges as well as invisible ways in which one
complies with dominant ideology (p. 111).
As Brueggemann and Moddelmog (2003) describe, “this approach to coming out
makes our classrooms places of comfort and discomfort because it encourages our
students and us to share our stories, to investigate our identities, and to name our
passions” (p. 216). Teachers and students must initiate this process of “fleshing out” of
our stories, identities and passions because it does not emerge effortlessly from an
educational culture of standardization and sterility. This initiation can be difficult, as
Martha Stoddard Holmes (2003) describes of her own experience of exposing bodies in
the classroom:
The classroom bodies were all under scrutiny, even when the class talked about
bodies, disabilities, or differences as concepts. Many discussions were
unintentionally painful in their association with the bodies the discussants lived in
outside of the classroom, bodies that were stared at, rejected, obstructed from
access to bathrooms and classrooms, diagnosed and classified, loved for the
wrong reasons, photographed, written about, beaten, as well as treated kindly,
loved, soothed and delighted (Freedman and Holmes, 2003, p. 5).
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While self-exposure can unearth powerful emotions in a classroom of adults, such a
process may emerge with less difficulty for children who have not yet experienced a
lifetime of affective repression. We can begin this dialogue even with very young
children (and we do this in preschool) by helping them name their thoughts, feelings,
emotions, and experiences, but this process needs to continue into adulthood. Perhaps, if
we engage children in this dialogue of disclosure as they grow, we can help them resist
the oppression and hegemony that has left so many of us feeling lost and distant.
Ng (2003) describes a similar reflexive process that she calls “teaching against the
grain,” a term she borrows from Marilyn Cochran-Smith (1991), in which we invite our
students in examining the ways that power relations based on race, gender, class, and/or
ability intersect to marginalize particular bodies. Ng suggests that we must move beyond
our well-meaning but misguided assumption that we should “treat everyone the same” in
an effort to avoid bias and inequality because in doing so we actually conceal the unequal
power relations that lead to marginalization. Similarly, as Ng (2003) explains,
“educational policies that assume that people are the same of equal may serve to entrench
existing inequality precisely because people enter into the educational process with
different and unequal experiences” (p. 214). Teaching against the grain bids us to
disclose and interrogate those different and unequal experiences in order to disclose the
power dynamics that construct the inequalities of particular bodies. As Ng (2003)
observes, “Rather than overlooking the embeddedness of gender, race, class, ability, and
other forms of inequality that shape our interactions, working against the grain makes
explicit the political nature of education and how power operates to privilege, silence,
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and marginalize individuals who are differently located in the educational process (p.
214).
What does this process of disclosure, dialogue, and discomfort look like in the
classroom? Ng (2003) submits the description offered by Cochran-Smith (1991), who is
worth quoting at length here:
To teach against the grain, teachers have to understand and work both within and
around the culture of teaching and the politics of schooling at their particular
schools and within their larger school system and communities . . .Without
condescension or defensiveness, they have to work with parents and other
teachers on different ways of seeing and measuring development, connecting and
dividing knowledge, and knowing about teaching and schooling. They have to be
astute observers of individual learners with the ability to pose and explore
questions that transcend cultural attribution, institutional habit, and the alleged
certainty of outside experts. They have to see beyond and through the
conventional labels and practices that sustain the status quo by raising
unanswerable and often uncomfortable questions. Perhaps most importantly,
teachers who work against the grain must name and wrestle with their own
doubts, must fend off the fatigue of reform and depend on the strength of their
individual and collaborative convictions that their work ultimately makes a
difference in the fabric of social responsibility (p. 284-85).
Such an engagement in critical, reflexive practice asks teachers to radically reevaluate
their traditional roles as technicians of a standardized curriculum and offer themselves up
to pedagogies of difference, responsiveness, and uncertainty. Thus, classrooms where
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discomfort is embraced as transformative become “spaces of intellectual and persona
discovery as we explore the ways in which identity can ground and trouble us and seek to
understand how we come to know what we think we know about ourselves and others”
(Brueggemann and Moddelmog, 2003, p. 216).
Context
Constructing these spaces for dialogue and discovery leads us also to consider
context. If we take seriously Restak’s (2003) claim that “the plasticity of our brains”
responds to our techno-cultural context by changing the way it is operates, then we
understand that our context, be it the classroom or another location beyond the school
campus, is an extension of who we are and how we work in that setting. A reflexive
concept of context, or space, is illustrated in Freire’s (1996) discussion of educational
space, in which he suggests, “We need to associate our workspace with certain qualities
that are extensions of ourselves. We make a space that will either remake us or will help
us accomplish our tasks. It is in this sense that what may seem circumstantial, mere
accessory in the educational space, ends up becoming as essential as the space itself” (p.
123). I envision the reflexive classroom as thriving, dynamic space that celebrates
discovery and incites curiosity. Such a classroom resonates with Ayers (2001) vision of a
liberated curriculum: one in which students are experiencing discovery and surprise,
engaging with primary sources and hands-on materials that they can experience
affectively rather than sanitized texts, creating, questioning, and confronting real
problems.
The classroom also needs to appeal to the larger cultural contexts of the learners
and must be, like the curriculum, labile so that new arrangements and technologies
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(multi-age or interest grouping, experimentation, discussion, multi-media devices) can
supplement student discovery as needed. This space enters into the critical dialogue and
is co-constructed by the community of learners in tandem with the lived curriculum. As
Friere (1996) suggests, “A good starting point for the school year may be a discussion
among educators and learners about their space and how to make it or maintain it as a
happy and pleasant place. There is a necessary relationship between the educator's body,
the learner's body, and the space in which they work. No living body fails to experience
its space” (p. 123).
In addition to considering the way we collaboratively construct the classroom
environment, we can also bring context into the critical dialogue in other meaningful
ways. We can recognize our affective investments in mass digital popular culture and
offer multiple readings – “seek out those voices that do not fit our world view or our
readings of popular culture texts” – in order to reconstruct our understandings of bodies,
and difference, and schooling (Daspit and Weaver, 2000, p. xix). We can allow popular
culture to raise important, and often, uncomfortable questions about the prevailing
educational narratives that have operated to objectify, diagnose and exclude particular
bodies.
We can also bring popular/political/personal context into our critical
conversations. I return to the Webber’s (2003) observation of the way we tend to
approach the problems that arise in schools: What are we going to do about this problem?
This question is indicative of a doing to strategy rather than the reflexive working with
approach. When, through our critical conversations, we confront the problems that will
arise as we attempt to co-operatively negotiate the curriculum, we can honor context by
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asking instead, “Why is this happening now, to whom, and in what setting?” (Webber,
2003, p. 193). In this way, when we confront issues such as disengagement, difference
and discontent, we can avoid wasting our time with quick-fix solutions like the measures
enacted to address school violence. As Noddings (2005) explains, the official response to
the series of highly publicized school shootings in the 1990s was “more surveillance
cameras, more security guards, better metal detectors, more locks, shorter lunch periods,
more rules,” all of which failed to create safer schools (p. 13). As Noddings (2005)
suggests, we should have been asking “why there has been a decline in security and how
we should address the problem. Do we need more prisonlike measures, or is something
fundamentally wrong with the entire school arrangement?” (p. 13). Such questions,
questions that require us look beyond the “quick fixes” that address only the symptoms of
a disembodied curriculum, honor the techno-cultural contexts of our students and allow
us to respond in more personal and meaningful ways. These are the kinds of questions
reflexive learners can confront through dialogue.
Prosthesis
We cannot consider “context” without recognizing the posthuman condition. To
say that we are posthuman is to recognize that our existence in the world is undeniably
mediated by technology, that we achieve what we perceive as “normalcy” only through
our complex interactions with techno-scientific interventions. In the digital age, the era
of nanotechnology, prostheses are no longer simply artificial body parts like arms, legs
and breast implants, but other extensions of our bodies that supplement the limitations of
the physical body and alter our affective perceptions: psychotropic drugs, virtual reality,
the internet, digital images, cell phones, iPods, and more. As Weaver (2005) suggests,
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“We can no longer see prosthetics as alien appendages to our bodies but things that are
melded onto and into our bodies and as a result enable us to feel, see, hear, and smell the
world differently” (p. 84). In the context of posthuman life, a reflexive pedagogy must
operate as a prosthetic, an outward extension of ourselves, that allows us to experience
the world differently. Confronted with our plasticity, with the idea that technology is not
separate but part of our bodies, we need to expose our discursive and affective evolutions
through dialogue. Weaver (2005) asserts that we have many questions to consider:
How are pharmaceuticals, cosmetic surgery, gene therapy, stem cell research,
performance enhancement drugs, cloning, and just simple interactive video games
and virtual reality changing our bodies? How are our capabilities enhanced as
athletes and scholars? What is the price for this enhancement or how does
technology as a supplement alter our bodies psychologically and physiologically?
How does the post human condition reconfigure such notions as natural and
artificial? Are these terms even relevant since they now blur together? Does a
natural body now constitute an underprivileged body? (Weaver, 2005, p. 91-92).
Indeed, as Weaver (2005) suggests here, we have many important and potentially
uncomfortable questions to consider: when and how do we bring our sometimes “secret”
cyborgism – including our optional “enhancements” – into the critical dialogue? How
could disclosing our own embodied understandings change the way we think about
normalcy, that elusive condition that often drives our prosthetic engagements? We cannot
meaningfully consider context in reflexive pedagogies without confronting these issues of
posthuman bodies and negotiating through social relations new ways of prosthetic
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understanding, and we can seek to do so through these interwoven, reflexive elements of
embodied pedagogies.
The elements I have explored here – disclosure, lability, dialogue, discomfort,
context, and prosthesis – are some of the ways that I envision reflexive pedagogies
emerging from the rhetorical morass of “no child left” standards, sanctions, and
accountability. Perhaps it is logically untenable to envision a future in which different
schools construct and adopt different learning goals and standards that are meaningful
and personal for their particular knowing-bodies, but that does not give us license to
abandon embodied pedagogy altogether. Rather, I believe that in the current climate of
high-stakes minimum competency accountability, it is more important than ever that we
seek ways to bring public education into the realm of the intimate, the personal, the
pleasurable, the affective. We must do this if we hope to make the marginalizing,
categorizing, alienating, dehumanizing institution that public education has become into
something liberating, meaningful, and promising.
As I look toward a reconceptualization of the curriculum and the body, I want
express the urgency of our task by bringing up the question posed by William Ayers
(2001):
When we teachers look out over our classrooms, what do we see? Half-civilized
barbarians? Savages? A collection of deficits, or IQs, or averages? Do we see
fellow creatures? We see students in our classrooms, of course, but who are they?
What hopes do they bring? What is the language of their dreams? What
experiences have they had, and where do they want to go? What interests or
concerns them, how have they been hurt, what are they frightened of, what will
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they fight for, and what and whom do they care about? What is their bliss? Their
pain? (p. 56).
Do we see a community of learners who come to us already inscribed in language,
already in need of critical dialogue? Do we see flesh and blood children, fellow
creatures, full with questions, confusions, needs and desires? Or do we see a spreadsheet
of deficits and liabilities? Can we, as teachers, really give our students, our children, our
future, what they deserve, what so many of us long to give them, when we are caught in
the gaze of accountability at every turn? Have our perceptions of teaching and learning,
our affective investments in the educational process, been clouded by the rhetoric of
standards and accountability? Can we stomach the blatant injustices, the labels and
pathologies, written on the bodies of our children in the name of achievement? How
many millions of children must we diagnose, other, exclude, and medicate before we
realize that we have been asking the wrong questions? Davis (2002) contends that:
Only when the veil is torn from the bland face of the average, only when the
hidden political and social injuries are revealed behind the mask of benevolence,
only when the hazardous environment designed to be the comfort zone of the
normal is shown with all its pitfalls and traps that create disability – only then will
we begin to face and feel each other in all that rich variety and difference of our
bodies, our minds, and our outlooks (Davis, 170).
In order to redefine difference and bring bodies fully into our classrooms and curricula,
into the “comfort zone of the normal,” we have to confront our seriously misguided
assumptions about assessment, accountability, and academic performance. We have to
ask ourselves what parents want their child to be seen merely as a collection of deficits to
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be filled before a test time, or a “sure bet” that can be left to his own vices, or a “lost
cause” that is abandoned to the isolation of a resource room? What child doesn’t deserve
to be “seen” in the classroom, embraced, celebrated, for all of the messy, complicated
idiosyncrasies that make every child extraordinary? Ultimately, we will have to decide
what the standardization, the efficient measurement of “Adequate Yearly Progress” is
worth to us. Until then, we have to seek out ways to keep hope, and our inquiring
subjectivities, alive.
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